Ecclestone v Telegraph Media Group Ltd

On an application to determine whether words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, the court must apply a high threshold and avoid usurping the jury’s function. The question is whether ordinary reasonable people generally could think less of the claimant, reading the words in their natural and ordinary meaning and in context. A statement expressing an acceptable opinion, including a lack of sympathy with those holding a contrary view, is ordinarily not defamatory merely because it may appear dismissive or disrespectful. Significant latitude is allowed in the manner in which permissible opinions are expressed. The result may differ where the language is violent, excessive or abusive, creates ridicule or hypocrisy, or otherwise causes ordinary reasonable people to think less of the claimant.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning a newspaper item reporting her views about vegetarianism, animal products and particular public figures. She pleaded that the words meant she was disrespectful and dismissive of those individuals and willing to disparage them publicly. The defendant applied under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Part 53 Practice Direction, paragraph 4.1(2), for a ruling that the words were incapable of being defamatory.

The central issue was whether the words, read by the ordinary reasonable reader in their context, were capable of lowering the claimant’s standing in the eyes of the public generally.

1. Application granted. The words complained of were not capable of bearing any defamatory meaning and the action was struck out.
2. The court adopted the threshold question whether the words were capable of lowering the claimant’s standing in the eyes of the public, reflecting the formulation in Skuse v Granada Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 278. The threshold for excluding a possible defamatory meaning is high, but the judge must rule against a viable cause of action where the words cannot properly be defamatory.
3. The court applied the principles that meaning must be assessed by reference to the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader, read once and in context. The reader is not unduly suspicious, but neither is avid for scandal. Context and the imprecision of language must be considered, consistently with Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe [2004] EMLR 6.
4. The statement that the claimant was not vegetarian and did not have much time for people who were vegetarian was an expression of a permissible opinion. Even if the phrase suggested dismissiveness or lack of respect, that did not mean ordinary reasonable people generally would think less of her. The relevant test was not whether a sector of the public might disapprove, as explained in Arab News Network v Al Khazen [2001] EWCA Civ 118.
5. There could be actionable cases involving ridicule, hypocrisy, violent or abusive language, or extreme views. This case involved none of those features. The claimant’s alleged falsity was immaterial to the capability issue.