Rufus v Elliott

In determining whether published words are defamatory, the court must first identify their single meaning, including any insinuations or implications conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader, and then decide whether that meaning is defamatory. An innuendo based on third-party publications may rely only on the pleaded extrinsic facts. It cannot attribute to the defendant defamatory material appearing only in those publications unless adopted or repeated. The question whether conduct lowers reputation must be assessed by the shared standards of society generally, rather than those of a particular section. Disclosure of private misconduct may therefore be regarded as legitimate where it exposes conduct by a public figure that conflicts with an expressed public stance. An allegation of disloyalty is not necessarily defamatory. The claim failed because the disclosure of racist abuse by an anti-racism campaign trustee would not generally be regarded as blameworthy.

The claimant and defendant were former professional footballers. The defendant issued a press release after resigning as a trustee of an anti-racism organisation. The release stated that a former friend and business colleague had made public a private text message in which the defendant had used a racially derogatory term.

The claimant alleged that readers who knew from earlier reporting that he had received the message would understand the release to accuse him of dishonourably betraying the defendant and deliberately harming his reputation by disclosing the message. An earlier application concerning whether the words were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning had been dismissed by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The issue at trial was the actual meaning of the release and whether that meaning was defamatory.

1. Meaning. The court adopted the conventional two-stage approach. It first identified the meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader, allowing for implication, inference and loose thinking, but avoiding an over-elaborate or overly literal analysis. It then considered whether that meaning was defamatory.
2. The pleaded innuendo established that some readers knew that the defendant had sent the claimant an offensive text message containing the n-word. To those readers, the release conveyed that the claimant had made public the message, which contained abuse and threats, and that the defendant had resigned because his own use of the term was inappropriate and inconsistent with his public position. The release did not convey that the claimant had acted dishonourably, disloyally, or deliberately sought to harm the defendant’s reputation.
3. The court could not use additional facts from the earlier newspaper article which had not been pleaded as innuendo facts. Nor could the claimant rely on defamatory implications conveyed only by third-party publications. Responsibility lay with the defendant for the meaning of the defendant’s own statement.
4. Defamatory character. The applicable common-law test was whether the words would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, or adversely affect him in the estimation of reasonable people generally. The relevant standards were collective standards shared by society at large, not the standards of a particular group.
5. The attributed conduct was not defamatory. Society generally strongly disapproved of the defendant’s racist abuse and would regard disclosure of such conduct by a public figure occupying an anti-racism role as legitimate and proper, notwithstanding the privacy of the message and any obligations arising from friendship. Even if the conduct were viewed as disloyal, such disloyalty would not generally be regarded as culpable or blameworthy.
6. The claim that the press release was defamatory was therefore dismissed. The court expressed doubts about the usefulness and admissibility of selected social-media responses but did not need to decide the general issue.

1. High Court (Queen's Bench Division): Dingemans J held that the words were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning and dismissed the defendant's application: [2013] EWHC 3355 (QB).
2. Court of Appeal: The appeal was dismissed. The court held that the earlier ruling was confined to the threshold question and directed a trial of actual meaning before a judge: [2015] EWCA Civ 121.
3. High Court (Queen's Bench Division): Warby J determined the actual meaning and held that the press release was not defamatory.