Shakil-Ur-Rahman v Ary Network Ltd & Anor

In determining the meaning of words spoken in television broadcasts, the court must identify the single meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer watching the programme once. The exercise is objective and impressionistic. The programme must be considered as a whole, with its tone, format, context and audience in mind, while avoiding lawyerly over-analysis.

Polemical or rhetorical presentation does not necessarily turn factual allegations into opinion. Statements may remain factual where they convey purportedly established facts, even though they are expressed forcefully. The court is not confined to the parties’ pleaded meanings and may identify a lesser or different meaning. An innuendo meaning must identify the extraneous facts on which it depends.

The claimant brought defamation proceedings concerning 24 Urdu television broadcasts and a further news report broadcast by the first defendant. The broadcasts concerned allegations that the claimant had acted against Pakistan, accepted foreign funding, interfered with investigations and committed treason or blasphemy.

The parties agreed publication and most translations. The preliminary trial was confined to the meanings conveyed by the broadcasts and whether those meanings were fact or opinion. Serious harm, responsibility for publication and whether the words were defamatory were reserved for later determination. The central issues were the proper approach to meaning in television broadcasts, the effect of innuendo and the distinction between fact and opinion.

1. Approach to meaning. The court applied the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer watching each programme once. The exercise was objective but involved an assessment of overall impression. The court considered each broadcast separately and avoided aggregating meanings across programmes.
2. Television context. The reasonable viewer was not naïve or unduly suspicious, but would engage in some loose thinking and would not analyse a broadcast as a lawyer. The court could consider its own impression, the programme’s format, the presenter’s style and the overall flavour of the broadcast. The theatrical use of an empty chair could contribute to an implication that the claimant was being put on trial in his absence.
3. Fact and opinion. The court applied the distinction between recognisable comment and factual imputation. Statements expressed as allegations, questions or rhetoric could remain factual where the context conveyed that the presenter was asserting proof or truth. Conversely, characterisations such as disloyalty, hypocrisy or betrayal could be comment where they represented evaluative judgments attached to underlying factual allegations.
4. Chase levels. The court treated allegations as capable of conveying different degrees of certainty: guilt, reasonable grounds for suspicion, or grounds for investigation. The broadcasts predominantly conveyed level 1 factual allegations, although some meanings conveyed suspicion or an invitation to explain.
5. Disposition. The court determined the meanings of all 25 broadcasts. Most of the claimant’s principal meanings were substantially borne out, although some allegations were rejected or reduced where the words lacked sufficient detail or did not identify the claimant personally. The court classified the resulting meanings as fact, comment or opinion as set out in the judgment. The serious-harm issue and other substantive defamation issues remained for a later trial.

This was a first-instance determination of preliminary issues. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.