Sahota v Middlesex Broadcasting Corporation Ltd & Ors

In determining the meaning of words spoken in a foreign-language television programme, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer, considering the programme as a whole and avoiding lawyerly or over-literal analysis. The court may use the judge’s overall impression, while recognising the limitations caused by transcripts and translations.

Whether words are fact or opinion is assessed objectively. An opinion should be recognisable as an inference, criticism or conclusion and should indicate, at least in general terms, the facts on which it is based. A meaning is defamatory where it would tend substantially to adversely affect the way right-thinking members of society generally would treat the claimant.

The claimant brought a defamation claim arising from a Punjabi-language television programme broadcast on MATV. The programme concerned a protest relating to Khalistani independence, Sikh religious symbols, Kashmir and Lord Nazir Ahmed. The parties agreed that references to “Sahota” and to the person described as Lord Ahmed’s partner referred to the claimant for the purposes of the preliminary issues.

Under a consent order, the court determined without a hearing the natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of, whether those meanings were defamatory at common law, which parts were fact or opinion, and whether any opinions indicated their bases.

1. Meaning. The court adopted the single-meaning approach directed to the ordinary reasonable viewer. The programme had to be read and understood as a whole, with its context and mode of publication taken into account. The court avoided an over-literal approach and considered the overall impression of the broadcast, while recognising that the Punjabi words had to be assessed through an agreed transcript and English translation.
2. The meanings conveyed were that the claimant had deceived and misled people; falsely professed support for Khalistani independence and was a hireling whose allegiance had been bought by Lord Ahmed; was not a true Sikh because of his treatment of the Nishan Sahib; stood with Kashmiri terrorists and risked involving Sikhs in violence, hatred and terrorism; and, with his family, commercialised the sale of the Guru Granth Sahib.
3. Fact and opinion. The allegations that the claimant had deceived people, had been paid by Lord Ahmed, had failed previously to support Khalistan and had commercialised Sikh scripture were statements of fact. The characterisation that he was not a true supporter of Khalistan, was not a true Sikh, and risked dividing the Sikh community and involving Sikhs in violence, hatred and terrorism were opinions based on the stated or conveyed facts. The bases of those opinions were indicated at least in general terms.
4. Defamation. Meanings (i), (ii) and (iv) were defamatory at common law. Meaning (iii), concerning the colour and shape of the Sikh flag and the associated opinion, would not substantially affect the claimant’s reputation in the eyes of right-thinking members of society. Meaning (v), concerning involvement in the commercial sale of religious books, was also not defamatory.
5. The conclusions applied to the words spoken by each defendant as set out in paragraph 67 of the judgment. The preliminary issues were therefore determined accordingly.

First-instance determination of preliminary issues. The judgment states that the issues were determined under a consent order sealed on 6 November 2020 and without a hearing, pursuant to CPR 23.8(b).