John v Times Newspapers Ltd (Rev 1)

On a meaning application, the court must assess the words as a whole and in context, through the eyes of the hypothetical reasonable reader. That reader is not naïve or unduly suspicious, and meanings requiring strained or unreasonable interpretation must be excluded. A mere possibility that some readers might infer a defamatory meaning is insufficient.

Where a publication identifies a person only as a former associate of someone expressly connected with alleged wrongdoing, that association alone may not support a defamatory imputation. The court must determine whether a jury could adopt the pleaded meaning without perversity. The claimant’s pleaded meanings were therefore incapable of arising from the articles.

The claimant brought a libel claim against the defendant newspaper concerning articles about film finance schemes and tax avoidance. He was named and pictured only in connection with Patrick McKenna, described inaccurately as his former accountant. The articles expressly alleged tax avoidance against other individuals but made no such allegation against the claimant.

The defendant applied under CPR Practice Direction 53 for a ruling that the words were incapable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meanings, namely actual involvement in immoral tax avoidance, reasonable suspicion of such involvement, or grounds for investigation. The central issue was whether those meanings could reasonably be inferred from the claimant’s alleged association with Mr McKenna.

1. Application granted. The words complained of were not capable of bearing the meanings pleaded by the claimant, or any other defamatory meaning concerning him. The action was accordingly dismissed.
2. The court applied the principles summarised in Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130. The governing principle was reasonableness. The hypothetical reasonable reader was neither naïve nor unduly suspicious, and would read the articles as a whole, including their context and any bane and antidote. Meanings dependent on strained, forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation had to be excluded.
3. The requirement to read the publication as a whole was reinforced by Charleston v Newsgroup Newspapers Limited [1995] 2 AC 65 and Dee v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 924 (QB); [2010] EMLR 20.
4. The pleaded Chase Level 1 and Level 2 meanings had no possible basis in the words. A Level 3 meaning was conceivable to some readers because of the alleged association with Mr McKenna, but a reader drawing that inference would fall outside the reasonable-reader standard. The articles did not provide any supporting material linking the claimant to tax avoidance.
5. The newspaper’s inaccurate description of Mr McKenna as the claimant’s former accountant was irrelevant to whether the words were capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. The court made no finding or assumption concerning Mr McKenna’s conduct, as he was not a party and had not been represented.