James v Saunders

In determining meaning in a defamation claim, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning that the ordinary reasonable reader would derive from the publication as a whole and in context. A defendant cannot generally recast an allegation as a limited reference to a past incident by relying on extrinsic knowledge or a hyperlink. Descriptions such as being a bully may be bare comments and therefore statements of fact rather than opinion. Allegations of corruptly obtaining public housing through political influence are also factual. A public interest defence requires adequate pleading of the defendant’s reasonable belief at the time of publication, including relevant verification steps. Where the evidence does not permit serious harm to be fairly determined as a preliminary issue, that issue should be left to trial.

The claimant, an employee of Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council and trade union official, brought a libel claim concerning one tweet and four blog posts published by the defendant. The publications described her as a bully or vicious bully and alleged that she had corruptly obtained a council house through political connections.

The court determined preliminary issues concerning meaning, fact or opinion, and common-law defamation. It also considered the defendant’s applications to amend the defence to plead honest opinion and public interest. The issue of serious harm was not determined as a preliminary issue.

1. Outcome. The court found that the publications conveyed the meanings identified in the judgment: the claimant was a bully or vicious bully, and that she had corruptly obtained a council house by exploiting political connections. The allegations were statements of fact and defamatory at common law.
2. Meaning. The task was to identify the single natural and ordinary meaning for the ordinary reasonable reader, avoiding lawyerly or over-elaborate analysis and reading each publication as a whole and in context. The references to the earlier 2014 post did not confine the bullying allegation to a single historic incident. The council-house allegations conveyed guilt rather than merely grounds for investigation. References to rumour, allegation and alleged influence did not neutralise the sting where the presentation was sarcastic, one-sided and supplied no reason for caution.
3. Fact or opinion. The allegation of corruptly obtaining a council house was an allegation of fact. The descriptions of the claimant as a bully or vicious bully were bare comments which, under the approach in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd, were treated as statements of fact. The statutory honest-opinion defence therefore could not succeed under Defamation Act 2013, s.3(2).
4. Defamation and serious harm. The meanings imputed conduct tending to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people and substantially affecting, or tending to affect, others’ attitudes towards her. The statutory serious-harm requirement remained applicable, but there was no evidence on that issue before the court. Following the approach identified in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd, it was inappropriate to determine serious harm merely by inference from the words at this stage.
5. Public interest. The amended pleading did not adequately state the defendant’s belief at the time of publication or the steps taken to verify the allegations. Repeating particulars of truth did not satisfy the distinct requirements of the public interest defence. Permission to add the defence was refused, although the defendant was not necessarily precluded from seeking a further properly pleaded amendment concerning the council-house allegation.