Jameel & Anor v Times Newspapers Ltd.

In libel proceedings, capability of meaning is assessed by the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable reader, reading the publication as a whole. A defamatory allegation is not removed from jury consideration merely because the publication reports allegations and includes the claimant’s denials. Where an article is arguably capable of conveying both reasonable grounds for suspicion and grounds merely for investigation, the distinction is for the jury. A separate legal person is not defamed merely because its proprietor is defamed; the publication must implicate the company itself, or suggest that it merits investigation for the same reasons. The court left unresolved whether the repetition rule applies to a level (iii) meaning.

The Sunday Times published an article reporting that Mr Yousef Jameel had been named as a defendant in proceedings brought in the United States by families of victims of the September 11 attacks. The article referred to a list of potential donors and included substantial denials and explanatory material. Mr Jameel and Hartwell PLC separately sued for libel.

Gray J held that the article could not bear the higher meaning that there were serious or substantial grounds for suspecting Mr Jameel of funding terrorism. He allowed Mr Jameel’s claim to proceed on the lower meaning that there were grounds for inquiry. He struck out Hartwell’s claim. The appeals concerned the proper range of meanings for the article and whether the alleged slur on Mr Jameel could defame Hartwell.

1. Mr Jameel’s appeal allowed. The article had to be assessed by its natural and ordinary meaning to the ordinary reasonable reader, read as a whole. The headline, photographs, allegations, denials and other corrective material all formed part of that assessment. The court applied the principles drawn from Skuse v Granada Television Ltd [1996] EMLR 278, Gillick v BBC [1996] EMLR 267 and Mark v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2002] EMLR 839.
2. The distinction between reasonable grounds for suspicion and grounds merely for inquiry was fine, but legally material. The article was arguably capable of conveying the higher meaning. Its refutatory passages were significant, but they did not constitute an incontestable antidote. It was therefore for a properly directed jury to decide whether the article conveyed the higher meaning, the lower meaning, or no defamatory meaning. Longmore LJ agreed that a juror could reasonably select the higher meaning, even though he would not personally interpret the article that way.
3. Hartwell’s appeal dismissed. A limited company is a distinct legal person. Defaming its proprietor does not, without more, defame the company. The publication must suggest that the company itself was implicated in the wrongdoing or suspicion, or merited investigation for the same reasons. The article did not do so. Hartwell’s claim therefore remained struck out.
4. The court declined to determine whether the conduct and repetition rules apply to a level (iii) meaning. It made tentative observations that such a meaning might in principle be justified by proving that a third party had alleged enough to warrant investigation, but noted serious practical objections to reliance on bare allegations.
5. Mr Jameel received the costs of the appeal. The respondent was ordered to pay 85% of his costs below. Permission to appeal was refused.

• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: Gray J, on 7 November 2003, struck out Hartwell’s claim, held that the article could not bear the higher defamatory meaning pleaded by Mr Jameel, and allowed Mr Jameel’s claim to proceed on the lower inquiry meaning.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Mr Jameel’s appeal was allowed and Hartwell’s renewed appeal was dismissed. The decision is reported at [2004] EWCA Civ 983.