Carson v Manweb Plc & Anor

Permission to appeal requires a real prospect of success. An amendment adding a new claim after expiry of the limitation period may be allowed only where the new claim arises from the same facts, or substantially the same facts, as an existing claim. A shareholder or director cannot sue in trespass concerning premises owned or possessed by the company. A person who merely supplies information to the police is liable for malicious prosecution only in the exceptional circumstances identified in Martin v Watson [1996] 1 AC 74. Misfeasance in public office should not be retained where it adds no distinct factual or practical basis to existing tort claims.

Mr Carson sought permission to appeal against orders made by Mr Justice Alliott on 20 July 2000. The judge refused amendments adding trespass claims, struck out or summarily dismissed the malicious prosecution claim against Manweb, and struck out the misfeasance claim against the Chief Constable. Other claims against the police were allowed to proceed to jury trial.

The proposed appeal concerned limitation and amendment, standing to sue in trespass, liability of an informant for malicious prosecution, and the case-management treatment of a broadly pleaded misfeasance claim.

The court unanimously refused permission to appeal because Mr Carson failed to show a real prospect of success.

1. Trespass and amendment. The proposed trespass claim concerning the Crooked Billet was introduced after more than six years. Under Civil Procedure Rules rule 17.4, an amendment after expiry of the limitation period could be allowed only if the new claim arose from the same facts, or substantially the same facts, as an existing claim. The proposed claim did not arise from the same facts as the malicious prosecution claim. Alternatively, refusal was a proper exercise of discretion because of the delay and failure to comply with earlier directions.
2. Mr Carson could not sue in trespass concerning the She Club premises. He was neither the owner nor entitled to possession. A shareholder, even a majority shareholder, and a company director has no right to bring such a claim in respect of company premises.
3. Malicious prosecution. Applying Martin v Watson [1996] 1 AC 74, an informant who is not technically the prosecutor may be liable only where he was actively instrumental in setting the prosecution in motion, falsely and maliciously identified the claimant as guilty, and the material facts were solely within the informant’s knowledge so that the prosecutor exercised no independent discretion. Manweb’s employees had supplied information about meter interference, had not identified Mr Carson as the offender, and did not possess the facts exclusively. The claim therefore had no real prospect of success.
4. Misfeasance. The pleaded misfeasance claim relied on the same facts as the traditional tort claims. The judge was entitled to remove it in the exercise of case-management powers because it added complications, served no practical purpose, and caused no prejudice by its removal. Three Rivers District Council and Others v Bank of England was referred to in describing the pleaded language and the nature of the tort.

The order was: application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): permission to appeal refused against the order of Mr Justice Alliott dated 20 July 2000.