BD Laddie (A Firm) v Becker

An appellate court should interfere with a discretionary order only where the decision was plainly wrong. A person may have a limited legitimate interest in the disposition of a fund where costs were negotiated and paid to solicitors acting for that person. That interest may include ensuring that payments are reasonable and proper, including costs relating to periods when the person acted in person. Where the interest is limited, the costs risk of pursuing separate proceedings remains relevant. A person subsequently joined to the proceedings may seek variation of an injunction in the court below. The earlier discretionary order should not fetter that later exercise of discretion.

BD Laddie (A Firm) v Becker concerned Mr Becker’s application for permission to appeal against an order made by Lloyd J in the Chancery Division on 2 March 2001. The order continued an interlocutory injunction restraining the disposal of £87,000 paid in settlement of solicitors’ costs, subject to payment of appropriate solicitors’ costs.

Mr Becker had been the client in earlier litigation and had been represented by several firms, including BD Laddie & Co and Carritt & Co. He was not a party when the injunction was granted, but was subsequently added as a defendant. He wished to protect an interest in the fund and to ensure that solicitors’ costs were agreed with him or properly assessed. The central questions were whether he had a legitimate interest in the fund and whether the discretionary order justified appellate intervention.

Application refused.

1. Lady Justice Hale reaffirmed the appellate restraint applicable to discretionary decisions. The Court of Appeal was reluctant to interfere with Lloyd J’s order and could do so only if the exercise of discretion was shown to be so plainly wrong that intervention was justified.
2. Mr Becker had established a legitimate, though limited, interest in the fund. He had negotiated the settlement of the costs, and the costs had been paid to solicitors who had acted for him. He was therefore entitled to seek to ensure that payments to those solicitors were reasonable and proper. He might also have a personal claim for costs relating to periods when he acted in person.
3. The limited nature of that interest was material. Pursuing the separate proceedings exposed Mr Becker to a costs risk which might substantially reduce the benefit of the underlying litigation. That consideration did not demonstrate that Lloyd J’s order was plainly wrong.
4. Mr Becker’s later joinder as a party did not justify granting permission. If he still wished to protect his interest, the quickest and simplest course was to apply in the court below for variation of the injunction. Such an application could seek to prevent payment unless the costs were agreed with him or assessed by a competent court or tribunal.
5. The earlier exercise of discretion was not to fetter the judge deciding any subsequent variation application. The order was that permission to appeal was refused and a copy of the transcript was supplied to Mr Becker at public expense.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) refused Mr Becker’s application for permission to appeal: [2001] EWCA Civ 1290.
2. High Court of Justice, Chancery Division—Lloyd J continued the interlocutory injunction on 2 March 2001.