Enonchong, R (on the application of) v Benefits Agency

Judicial review is not a general fallback where Parliament has provided a statutory appeal procedure. A person cannot ordinarily use judicial review to make a further challenge merely because dissatisfied with the result of that procedure. The existence of an alternative remedy is particularly significant where the applicant has not pursued the available final appeal step. A decision is not unlawful merely because its reasons are brief. Where the decision and the basis for it are sufficiently clear in context, brevity alone does not establish arbitrariness, procedural unfairness or an arguable ground for judicial review.

The Benefits Agency withdrew the applicant’s income support. The decision was challenged through the social security appeal procedure. The Social Security Appeal Tribunal confirmed the decision and refused leave to appeal, and the Commissioner subsequently refused leave in relation to that decision.

The applicant then sought judicial review. Scott Baker J refused permission on paper. Following an oral hearing, Poole J also refused permission. The applicant applied to the Court of Appeal, arguing that Poole J had given inadequate reasons, had acted contrary to natural justice and the right to a fair trial, and had contradicted the Commissioner’s decision. The central issues were whether judicial review could be used as a further challenge despite the statutory appeal route and whether the brevity of the High Court’s decision made it unlawful.

1. Disposition. Lord Justice Pill refused permission to appeal. Mr Justice Rimer agreed. The application was therefore refused unanimously.
2. Alternative statutory remedy. Parliament had provided a sequence of remedies for challenging the income-support decision: appeal to the Social Security Appeal Tribunal, application for leave to the Commissioner, and a further application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The applicant had not taken the final step. Whether that appeal might have succeeded was left open.
3. Judicial review was not a further appeal. Judicial review was not a catch-all remedy available whenever a person remained dissatisfied after using, or failing to complete, an alternative appeal procedure. On the information before the court, there was no unlawful decision of the Commissioner or the Benefits Agency which could properly be quashed.
4. Brevity of reasons. Poole J’s decision was brief, but brevity alone was not a ground of appeal. The judge had made his conclusion clear and had referred to Scott Baker J’s decision, which in turn referred to the Commissioner’s letter. In the circumstances, the reasons were sufficient and the challenge based on arbitrariness, natural justice or unfair trial was not arguable.
5. Possible complaint against the DSS. Pill LJ found the Commissioner’s reference to a possible complaint against the DSS difficult to understand. At most, a claim might arise if the DSS refused to make a payment which it accepted it was legally obliged to make. The papers disclosed no such matter and no prospect of intervention by the Court of Appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused permission to appeal and refused the application. [2001] EWCA Civ 1328.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Scott Baker J refused permission on paper. Poole J refused permission after an oral hearing on 4 December 2000.
• Social Security Appeal Tribunal and Commissioner: The Tribunal confirmed the income-support decision and refused leave to appeal. The Commissioner subsequently refused leave in relation to that decision.