H (A Child), Re

In care and adoption proceedings, the appellate court will not interfere with a first-instance decision merely because another judge might have reached a different conclusion or obtained a further assessment. The question is whether the judge acted within the broad ambit of discretion, having regard to the child’s welfare, existing attachments, the quality of available parenting and the potential detriment caused by delay. A recent parental relationship may be relevant, but the court is not required to adjourn for expert assessment where the evidence and professional opinions support proceeding. Once it has been decided that the child cannot be cared for by the natural parent and must be brought up in another family, the advantages of adoption may justify dispensing with parental consent.

D was born to R, herself a minor, and was removed into foster care shortly after birth because of concerns arising from the family circumstances. The local authority applied for a care order and later sought to free D for adoption. Shortly before the final hearing, R became engaged to G R and sought an adjournment for an expert assessment of their relationship and its possible effect on her parenting capacity.

The deputy High Court judge refused the adjournment, made a care order, and then dispensed with R’s consent and made a freeing order. R appealed, challenging both the refusal to obtain a further assessment and the findings about her and G R’s ability to care for D. The central issue was whether the judge had exceeded the permissible ambit of discretion in making the orders.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that the judge’s case management decision to continue the hearing while keeping the need for any further assessment under review was within the broad discretionary ambit. The criticism that the application was too late was difficult to accept, but the judge’s actual management of the hearing was lawful.
2. The judge was entitled to rely heavily on the clinical psychologist’s balanced and reasoned evidence. The evidence supported findings that D’s loss of his foster carer would be significant, that an early move was desirable, and that delay would be detrimental. The judge was also entitled to find that R could not meet D’s needs and that G R could not compensate for her shortcomings, notwithstanding his favourable impression and the developing relationship.
3. The Court of Appeal recognised that another judge might have adjourned for an assessment or reached a different conclusion. That possibility did not justify intervention. The relevant question was whether this judge exceeded the broad ambit of discretion in deciding that the care order was necessary to meet D’s needs.
4. That conclusion substantially determined the freeing application. Once D had to be cared for in another family, the advantages of adoption were outstanding. The hypothetical reasonable parent, recognising that an alternative family would need the legal status of parent, would have consented. The judge was therefore entitled to dispense with R’s consent and make the freeing order.

Permission to appeal was granted, but the appeals were dismissed. There was no order for costs, save for legal aid assessment.

• High Court of Justice, Family Division: The deputy High Court judge refused an adjournment for a further expert assessment, made a care order, dispensed with the mother’s consent, and made a freeing order for adoption.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was granted, but the appeals were dismissed: [2001] EWCA Civ 1432.