Sassoon v Grover

On a second-tier appeal, permission should be granted only where the proposed appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. A litigant’s lack of legal representation or the refusal of an adjournment does not, without more, satisfy that threshold. The Court of Appeal will not normally reopen factual findings based on oral evidence where the first appeal provided a further opportunity to present the case and the proposed challenge has no real prospect of success. A disagreement with the trial judge’s assessment of witnesses or evidence is not itself an important point of principle or a compelling reason.

Mr Grover sought permission for a second appeal from the judgment of His Honour Judge Michael Oppenheimer, dated 9 August 2001, which had dismissed his appeal from a District Judge’s order. The order gave Mr Sassoon possession of commercial premises and judgment for rent arrears and interest. Mr Grover alleged breaches of the fair-trial guarantee in Article 6 of the Convention on Human Rights, challenged the refusal of an adjournment, disputed findings about Mr Sassoon’s knowledge of the tenant company’s dissolution, and maintained that repairs had been agreed in lieu of rent. The central issue was whether the proposed appeal met the second-tier permission threshold.

Application refused. Lord Justice Aldous held that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to grant permission under Part 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 unless the proposed appeal raised an important point of principle or practice, or there was some other compelling reason for the court to hear it.

1. The applicant had already had two opportunities to present his case: before the District Judge and on the rehearing before His Honour Judge Oppenheimer. The refusal of an adjournment was an exercise of the County Court judge’s discretion, supported by reasons, and raised no important point of principle or practice or other compelling reason.
2. The complaint under Article 6 did not establish an unfair trial. Acting in person created the ordinary difficulties of self-representation, but Mr Grover had an opportunity to put his case. The rehearing also allowed him to present it in full.
3. The challenges to the findings that Mr Sassoon lacked prior knowledge of the company’s dissolution and that there was no enforceable agreement to set repairs off against rent were factual challenges. The trial judge had heard the witnesses and assessed their evidence. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.
4. The alleged repairs-for-rent agreement was the crux of the case. It could not justify continued possession or defeat the rent claim where the judge had found no legally enforceable agreement, the tenant was already obliged to carry out full repairs, and Mr Grover guaranteed that obligation. Leave to appeal was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused Mr Grover’s application for permission for a second appeal: [2001] EWCA Civ 1458.
2. County Court: His Honour Judge Michael Oppenheimer dismissed Mr Grover’s appeal on 9 August 2001.
3. District Judge: ordered possession of the premises and judgment for rent arrears and interest on 6 October 2000.