Berkeley Leisure Group Ltd v Hampton

Under the Mobile Homes Act 1983, an occupier receives statutory security only if the agreement permits the mobile home to be stationed on land forming part of a protected site. The relevant site must be identified by reference to the planning permission and site licence applicable to that land and its permitted user. A single licence covering a whole caravan park does not prevent the park being divided where the permissions distinguish areas. Permission for permanent residence on other plots is insufficient. The court should also avoid a construction producing hardship or absurdity, such as exposing an owner to criminal liability while leaving no practical means of removing an unlawfully occupied caravan. Protection is assessed by reference to the particular plot and occupier’s circumstances.

Berkeley Leisure Group Ltd purchased Halcyon Park, a caravan park containing plot 64. The respondent occupied a mobile home there as his only or main residence and paid rent. Planning permissions allowed permanent unrestricted residential use on specified plots in a central area, but plot 64 was outside that area. The site licence also restricted occupation on plot 64 during part of the year.

Berkeley served notices seeking possession. The Southend County Court, presided over by His Honour Judge Rice, dismissed the claim, holding that plot 64 formed part of a protected site because the park as a whole had permission for permanent residential occupation elsewhere. The central issue on appeal was whether plot 64 was, or formed part of, a protected site for the purposes of the Mobile Homes Act 1983.

Lord Justice Robert Walker delivered the first judgment. Lord Justice Peter Gibson agreed with it entirely. The appeal was allowed.

1. Statutory threshold. Protection under section 1(1) of the Mobile Homes Act 1983 depends on an agreement permitting the occupier to station a mobile home on land forming part of a protected site. The definition in section 1(2) of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 operates by reference to the planning permission and site licence relevant to the land and user in question.
2. Identification of the relevant site. A site licence covering an entire park does not require every part of the park to be treated as one protected site. Where planning permissions and the site licence distinguish between areas as to permitted use, it may be natural and necessary to treat the park as divided. The physical distinction in this case was reinforced by differing susceptibility to flooding. Permanent residential permission for other plots therefore did not protect plot 64.
3. Hardship and absurdity. The court adopted the general interpretive concern derived from Balthazar v Mullane [1985] 2 EGLR 260. It would be slow to construe the legislation so that the owner could face enforcement consequences or criminal sanctions while being unable to remove a caravan because its occupier had statutory protection.
4. Holmes v Cooper. Holmes v Cooper [1985] 1 WLR 1060 supported assessing protection by the individual caravan-dweller’s circumstances rather than by those of neighbouring occupiers. Its treatment of the travelling-showman exception did not require the whole of Halcyon Park to be treated as one protected site.
5. The judge had therefore erred in construction and application of the statutory provisions. The appeal was allowed, the orders below were discharged, and a possession order was made effective in six weeks. Berkeley received its costs. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords and a stay were refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). On 5 October 2001, the court allowed Berkeley’s appeal in [2001] EWCA Civ 1474, discharged the county court orders and made a possession order effective in six weeks.
• Southend County Court. His Honour Judge Rice dismissed Berkeley’s claim for possession on 4 May 2001.