Case details
Summary
An absolute statutory time limit for appealing a forfeiture order is not incompatible with the Convention merely because it admits no extension. The relevant question is whether the limitation pursues a legitimate aim and maintains a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means used and that aim. Finality in forfeiture proceedings may constitute a legitimate aim. Where the applicant knew of the order, had legal representation and offered no sufficient reason for delay, refusal to extend the time limit does not impair the right of access to a court.
Factual background
The claimant sought permission to appeal against Burton J’s refusal to grant certiorari in respect of forfeiture decisions made by the West London Magistrates Court and Blackfriars Crown Court. The magistrates had ordered forfeiture of Swiss francs and sterling found on the claimant before a flight to Amsterdam. The statutory appeal application was filed approximately five days late.
Burton J construed section 44 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 and Crown Court rule 7(5) as imposing a non-extendable 30-day period. Buxton LJ refused an extension of time for appealing to the Court of Appeal. The renewed application concerned whether the statutory scheme could be read compatibly with Convention rights and whether the related complaints had any realistic prospect of success.
Held
- Permission refused. The application was dismissed because the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success.
- Burton J’s construction of section 44(2) and section 44(4) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, together with Crown Court rule 7(5), was not challenged except on Convention grounds. The court proceeded on the basis that the legislation fixed a 30-day appeal period without power to extend it.
- The right of access to a court under Article 6(1) is not absolute. A limitation is permissible where it pursues a legitimate aim and bears a reasonable relationship of proportionality to that aim. The court applied the approach stated in Stubbings v The United Kingdom [1996] 23 EHRR 213, at paragraph 48.
- Finality in forfeiture proceedings may be a legitimate aim because public authorities need to know when money has been effectively forfeited. An absolute 30-day period might raise proportionality concerns for a person who had no realistic means of knowing about the order. That was not this case. The claimant was present personally or represented when the forfeiture order was made, had solicitors, and identified no adequate reason why the appeal application could not have been filed in time.
- The seizure of the money and refusal to release funds for legal representation did not prevent timely filing of the appeal application. Since there was no realistic prospect of extending time, the further arguments concerning release of cash, legal aid under Article 6(3)(c), and the independence of the magistrates also had no realistic prospect of success.
Order: application dismissed. Community Service Funding assessment of the applicant’s costs.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.
Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2001] EWCA Civ 1501. Buxton LJ refused an extension of time for appealing and considered that the proposed appeal had no prospect of success. On renewal, Arden LJ refused permission and dismissed the application.
- Queen’s Bench Division (Burton J): Burton J refused certiorari in relation to the magistrates’ and Crown Court decisions and held that the 30-day statutory appeal period could not be extended.
- West London Magistrates Court and Blackfriars Crown Court: forfeiture order made in respect of the seized money.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.
Cases citing this case
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.