Sarah Lindsay Williams -v- Donald Andrew Williams

Permission to appeal under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 requires an important point of law or practice, or another compelling reason. Complaints about late notice of public funding, an order allegedly capable of causing bankruptcy, and an erroneous factual finding did not satisfy that threshold. Whether a financial order is excessive is ordinarily fact-specific, particularly where the factual issue could have been raised in the County Court appeal. A later change in child-support liability is properly addressed through an application for variation of periodical payments and, where appropriate, remission of arrears.

The proceedings arose from ancillary relief following the breakdown of the marriage. District Judge Field awarded the wife the net matrimonial capital of £32,000, periodical payments of £450 per month and three quarters of her costs. The husband appealed to Judge McNaught in the Swindon County Court, who considered that the order was within the discretionary range.

By the time of that appeal, the Child Support Agency had assessed the husband to pay £559 per month for the children. The husband sought permission to appeal, relying on omitted bank evidence, procedural complaints concerning public funding, alleged financial impossibility and an erroneous factual finding. The central issue was whether the application met the statutory permission threshold.

Application refused. Lord Justice Thorpe applied the high permission threshold in section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. The applicant had to demonstrate an important point of law or practice, or some other compelling reason.

1. The complaint that the wife had served notice of her public funding certificate only on the day of the hearing did not raise an important point of law or practice. Her legally aided status should already have been apparent from the earlier order providing for assessment of her public funding costs.
2. The submission that the financial order might lead to bankruptcy was merely a generalisation. The issue was whether the order was excessive on the particular facts, and that did not amount to a point of wider legal or practical significance.
3. The alleged failure to take account of bank evidence concerning child-support payments, and the asserted factual error, were matters which could have been raised before Judge McNaught. They did not justify permission to appeal.
4. The later Child Support Agency assessment was a significant change in the financial circumstances. If the periodical-payments order had become unaffordable, the appropriate course was an application in the County Court for variation and for remission of arrears. The Court of Appeal was not required to correct the position through this permission application.
5. The judge also expressed the tentative view that there was no power to order security for costs of an appeal of this kind. That observation was not necessary to the disposition. He noted, as practical guidance, that arrears more than 12 months old were almost never enforced, but left the applicant to choose whether to seek variation or await any enforcement proceedings.

The formal order was that the application be refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 10 October 2001, the application for permission to appeal, including the related application concerning further evidence and stay of execution, was refused: [2001] EWCA Civ 1506.
• Swindon County Court — Judge McNaught heard the husband’s appeal on 21 May 2001 and considered the District Judge’s order to be within the discretionary range.
• District Judge Field — On 5 September 2000, made the ancillary relief order awarding the wife the matrimonial capital, periodical payments and costs.