Begley, R (on the application of) v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police

A chief constable may choose between the probationary dismissal procedure and the disciplinary procedure when deciding whether a police probationer should remain in the force. The probationary procedure is not confined to inefficiency or poor performance. It may be used where misconduct raises a question about the officer’s suitability to attain established status. Regulation 14(2) does not require notification of an extension of probation, although notification may be desirable. Failure to notify does not invalidate the extension. Permission for judicial review should be refused where the proposed challenge discloses no arguable breach of natural justice, procedural invalidity or irrationality.

Michelle Begley, a former West Midlands police officer, renewed an application for permission to seek judicial review of the Chief Constable’s decision to dispense with her services during probation. Ouseley J refused permission on paper. Richards J refused permission at a hearing on 11 April 2001, when the applicant was represented by counsel.

The applicant alleged apparent bias because the Chief Constable was involved in employment tribunal proceedings and in operating the force. She also contended that her probation had not been validly extended because she had not been notified, and that misconduct allegations required use of the disciplinary procedure rather than the probationary procedure. The central issues were whether the probationary system was lawfully available and whether the decision was procedurally unfair or otherwise unlawful.

1. Renewed application refused. The court allowed the extension of time but refused permission to pursue the judicial review application.
2. There was no breach of natural justice. Richards J had distinguished Chief Constable of Merseyside Police ex parte Bennion, and the Court of Appeal decision in that litigation had subsequently reversed Toulson J’s judgment. The concern that employment tribunal proceedings could paralyse statutory police disciplinary proceedings supported the conclusion that the Chief Constable was not disqualified from investigating or deciding the matter. The applicant had also received a hearing before the Assistant Chief Constable.
3. Regulation 14(2) did not require notification to the officer when probation was extended. Although notification would have been preferable, its absence did not invalidate the extension. The extension was not shown to be unreasonable, particularly as the applicant had been suspended on full pay during magistrates’ court proceedings.
4. The force was entitled to choose whether to use the probationary dismissal procedure or the disciplinary procedure. The court relied on Chief Constable British Transport Police ex parte Farmer.
5. The complaints were capable of bearing on suitability for established office, although they involved alleged misconduct. The Chief Constable was entitled to consider the alleged assault, observations made by the Crown Court judge despite the absence of a criminal conviction, unauthorised use of the police computer, and the interview given while suspended.
6. The detailed probation-assessment procedure was directed to inefficiency or lack of performance. It was inappropriate where dismissal was based on specific misconduct. The application therefore had no realistic prospect of success.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): the renewed application was heard by Lord Justice Buxton on 18 October 2001. Extension of time was allowed, but permission to apply for judicial review was refused.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Ouseley J refused permission on paper, followed by Richards J refusing permission at a hearing on 11 April 2001.