R (Bennion) v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police

Police disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial, but a chief constable is not automatically disqualified merely because the officer is suing the force in related employment proceedings. Natural justice must be applied in the statutory and operational context. Under the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985, the chief officer normally hears disciplinary charges. Remission is mandatory only where the chief officer has an interest other than in that official capacity. Otherwise, remission is discretionary. Personal involvement, a closer interest, or a real danger of bias may require recusal. A nominal role as respondent, without a personal allegation or personal stake, is insufficient where the disciplinary issues are factually distinct. A careful refusal to remit will stand absent a demonstrated error.

The Chief Constable appealed against Toulson J’s decision quashing his refusal to remit disciplinary proceedings against Chief Inspector Bennion to another chief officer. Bennion had brought Employment Tribunal proceedings alleging sex discrimination and victimisation against the force and Superintendent Rooney. She later faced disciplinary charges concerning her dealings with a car dealer and suspected vehicle-importation offences. The Chief Constable was formally a respondent to the Employment Tribunal proceedings, but no personal allegation was made against him and the disciplinary issues were largely distinct. The central issue was whether he could fairly adjudicate under the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985 while being a respondent in the related employment proceedings.

Disposition and statutory framework

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously. Lord Justice Judge delivered the leading judgment. Lady Justice Hale and Lord Justice Henry agreed that the Chief Constable was entitled to hear the disciplinary charges and refuse remission.
2. Regulation 13.1 of the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985 ordinarily required a disciplinary charge to be heard by the chief officer. Regulation 14.2 required remission where the chief officer had an interest otherwise than in his official capacity. Regulation 14.7 gave a discretionary power to remit where remission was considered appropriate. Lord Justice Henry described the scheme as entrusting the Chief Constable with the ordinary duty to hear cases, while distinguishing personal interests from interests arising only from his office.
3. The principles of natural justice applied, but had to be adapted to the particular decision-making process. A Chief Constable was not in the same position as a judge or a private-law employer. His operational responsibility for the force meant that he necessarily had a general interest in disciplinary proceedings. That official responsibility did not itself create automatic disqualification.
4. Automatic disqualification required personal involvement or another interest closer than the general responsibilities of office, or an objectively established real danger of bias. The Chief Constable was only a nominal or titular respondent in the Employment Tribunal proceedings. He faced no personal allegation or personal financial exposure, and the disciplinary allegations concerned dealings with Collins rather than the alleged discriminatory conduct. The Employment Tribunal would remain free to consider its claims independently. The authorities concerning automatic disqualification, including R v Gough [1993] AC 646 and Locabail (UK) Limited v Bayfield Properties Limited [2000] QB 451, did not justify creating a new automatic category.
5. Once automatic disqualification and a real danger of bias were rejected, the issue was whether the exercise of the Regulation 14.7 discretion was wrong. Applying the principle in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, the court respected the decision entrusted to the Chief Constable. His reasoning was transparent, careful and scrupulous. He was therefore entitled to refuse remission.

The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s agreed costs of £22,132 in the Court of Appeal and £6,383.90 at first instance.

• Court of Appeal allowed the Chief Constable’s appeal and restored the decision not to remit the disciplinary proceedings.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Toulson J, had quashed the Chief Constable’s decision on the basis that the judicial impartiality principle applied where the head of an organisation was being sued by the person whom he was required to judge.