Stegers v Donne Mileham & Haddock

The Human Rights Act 1998 does not give a litigant unlimited time to appeal. Section 7(5)(a) concerns proceedings for a violation of the Act, while section 6(1) does not displace the Rules of Court governing appeal deadlines. A substantial and continuing delay, explained by work commitments and the applicant’s decision to pursue an unsuccessful judicial review, was insufficient to enlarge time. In any event, a second appeal from a County Court requires a realistic prospect of success and a real and important point of legal principle. Alleged factual error, bias or fraud did not meet that threshold.

Mr Stegers instructed solicitors after suffering injury in a road traffic accident. He later claimed damages against them, alleging that they had acted without authority and had obtained a medical report without his knowledge. His claim was dismissed at an arbitration before District Judge Jackson on 24 June 1999. Her Honour Judge Coates dismissed his subsequent appeal or application to set aside on 7 April 2000.

Mr Stegers then pursued judicial review. Turner J held that application to be out of time, and Pill LJ refused permission to appeal. He subsequently applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal directly against Judge Coates’ decision. The central issues were whether the lengthy delay should be excused and whether the proposed second appeal raised the necessary legal point.

Permission to appeal was refused. The application was one year and four months out of time, and there was no good reason to enlarge the period.

1. Section 7(5)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 gives a year for proceedings concerning a violation of the Act. It does not govern the time for bringing an appeal. Section 6(1), which requires courts and other public authorities to act compatibly with the Convention, does not confer unlimited time for an appeal or displace the Rules of Court.
2. Mr Stegers’ explanation was that he was a working man who had devoted his time to unsuccessful judicial review proceedings before attempting a direct appeal. That was his own procedural choice. The fact that the applications to Judge Coates and Turner J had also been made out of time showed a continuing history of delay. There was no evidence that he had been actively misled by an adviser, which might have provided a different explanation.
3. Even if the application had been timely, the proposed appeal was a second appeal from the County Court. Permission required a realistic prospect of success and a real and important point of legal principle. The proposed grounds were essentially challenges to factual findings concerning the medical report, including allegations of bias, fraud and factual error. They did not satisfy the second-appeal threshold.

The court therefore refused permission on the ground of delay, and held that the proposed appeal would in any event have been unviable.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division). On 23 October 2001, Lord Justice Sedley refused permission to appeal because the application was substantially out of time and did not raise a real and important point of legal principle: [2001] EWCA Civ 1587.
2. Court of Appeal. Pill LJ refused permission to appeal against Turner J’s decision on the judicial review application.
3. High Court. Turner J held that the judicial review application was out of time.
4. Brighton County Court. District Judge Jackson dismissed the damages claim at arbitration. Her Honour Judge Coates later dismissed the appeal or application to set aside.