Ahmad v Barclays Bank Plc

A claim against a chargee and its receiver for alleged misconduct and breach of duty in dealing with charged property is not a claim for recovery of a specialty debt merely because the underlying loan is secured by a legal charge. The applicable limitation period depends on the cause of action. Where the relevant facts, including the sale and selling price, were known before completion, Limitation Act 1980, section 32 provides no arguable basis for postponing limitation. Permission to appeal and an extension of time may be refused where the proposed appeal has no real prospect of success, no compelling reason to proceed, and the delay is unexplained.

The claimant had charged two properties to Barclays to secure a loan. Following default, Barclays appointed receivers over the rents, and the property was later sold. More than six years after the sale, the claimant sued Barclays and the receiver, alleging mishandling of rents and other misconduct causing financial loss.

District Judge Reid struck out the claim as statute-barred and for disclosing no reasonable grounds. Her Honour Judge Hallon treated the appeal as a rehearing and dismissed it, finding no arguable case under section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980. The claimant sought permission to appeal approximately six months out of time, arguing that a 12-year limitation period applied because the secured debt was a specialty debt.

Application dismissed. Permission to appeal was refused, and an extension of time would also have been refused. There was no order for costs.

1. Nature of the claim and limitation. The claimant’s cause of action was based on alleged misconduct and breach of duty by Barclays as chargee and by its receiver in their dealings with the property, culminating in the sale. It was not a claim for recovery of a specialty debt. The fact that the loan was secured by a legal charge did not make the 12-year limitation period applicable. The lower courts were therefore right to proceed on the basis of a six-year period.
2. Section 32. Her Honour Judge Hallon had properly considered whether the running of limitation could be deferred under section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 on the ground that a relevant fact had been deliberately concealed. There was no arguable case because the claimant knew of the sale and its price before completion. There was no real prospect of interfering with that conclusion.
3. Permission and delay. The proposed appeal had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason for it to proceed. Independently, the claimant had given no satisfactory explanation for the substantial delay in complying with the rules governing permission applications. An extension of time would therefore have been refused in any event.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Parker refused permission to appeal and dismissed the application. [2001] EWCA Civ 1590.
• Bromley County Court: District Judge Reid struck out the claim as statute-barred and for disclosing no reasonable grounds. Her Honour Judge Hallon dismissed the claimant’s interlocutory appeal on 6 September 2000.