Hassan & Anor v Hassan

On a further appeal in family financial proceedings, section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 requires permission to be refused unless the applicant raises an important point of law or practice, or another compelling reason. This is a high threshold. An appellate court should generally respect factual findings made by a trial judge who heard and saw the witnesses. A litigant has no unrestricted right to a second appeal after the first appeal has been dismissed. Complaints about implementing a financial order should be made in the Family Division, rather than investigated on a permission application.

The proceedings concerned ancillary financial relief following the breakdown of a long marriage. After a contested hearing, District Judge Moorhouse found that the husband had breached his duty of full and frank disclosure, inferred that he had undisclosed assets, and ordered that the wife retain the family home, receive a £50,000 lump sum and receive £20,000 towards her costs.

The husband appealed to the High Court. Mr Justice Coleridge dismissed that appeal on 22 May 2001. The husband then applied to the Court of Appeal for permission for a further appeal, challenging the factual findings and the fairness of the financial division. The central issue was whether the statutory threshold for a further appeal was satisfied.

Lord Justice Thorpe dismissed the application for permission to appeal.

1. The trial judge was responsible for finding the facts and had the significant advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses under cross-examination. An appellate court should not regard itself as better placed to determine the justice of factual conclusions, particularly where the first-instance assessment involved credibility and disclosure.
2. Under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, where an appeal has already been heard in the court of trial, the Court of Appeal must not grant permission for a further appeal unless there is an important point of law or practice, or some other compelling reason. The provision sets a high hurdle. The husband’s disagreement with the findings, his contention that the wife had received most of the incontrovertible assets, and his challenge to the speculative assessment did not meet it.
3. The family justice system provides an initial right of appeal, but that right does not extend to an unrestricted second appeal. The husband’s appellate rights were therefore exhausted when the High Court dismissed his appeal.
4. The husband’s complaint that a charge affecting his home constrained compliance with the lump-sum order was not a matter for investigation by the Court of Appeal. Any issue concerning implementation had to be raised by application in the Family Division.

Order: application for permission to appeal dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): application for permission to appeal dismissed. [2001] EWCA Civ 1635.
2. High Court of Justice, Family Division: Mr Justice Coleridge dismissed the husband’s appeal on 22 May 2001. No citation was stated.
3. Principal Registry of the Family Division: District Judge Moorhouse made ancillary relief orders on 20 April 2001 after finding a breach of the duty of full and frank disclosure.