Hood (An Infant), R (on the application of) v London Borough of Harrow

Under section 86 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, a local education authority must comply with parental preference unless doing so would prejudice efficient education or the efficient use of resources. That duty does not make every disappointed preference, or every change to school-linkage arrangements, irrational. Authorities must allocate educational resources in difficult circumstances. Where the published admissions rules have been followed and the arrangements are not shown to be irrational, judicial review has no realistic prospect of success.

Mrs Hood sought permission to appeal from an order of Gibbs J dated 16 October 2000, refusing permission to apply for judicial review. The proposed judicial review challenged an independent admission appeals panel’s refusal to secure her daughter’s admission to Park High School from September 2000.

The original challenge disputed the panel’s finding that admitting an additional pupil would prejudice efficient education or the efficient use of resources. The proposed appeal also raised a new argument that Harrow had acted irrationally by changing the linkage arrangements between schools, thereby making some parental first preferences more likely to be refused. The central issue was whether either ground disclosed an arguable public-law error.

Lord Justice Longmore dismissed the application for permission to appeal. The application for further evidence and oral evidence therefore did not arise.

1. Statutory framework. Section 86 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 requires parental preference to be honoured unless admitting the preferred pupil would prejudice the provision of efficient education or the efficient use of resources. If prejudice is not established, the preference must be acted upon.
2. Admission-panel decision. The panel had considered the education department’s evidence that the relevant year group was full. Its chairman’s evidence stated that the panel had unanimously found prejudice after considering the issue. The decision letter was consistent with that account. The applicant’s contrary recollection did not provide a credible basis for challenging the decision. Gibbs J was therefore entitled to conclude that there was no realistic prospect of quashing it.
3. School-linkage arrangements. The authority’s arrangements gave priority through a stated sequence, including statemented pupils, medical reasons, siblings and linked middle schools, followed where necessary by distance from the school. If demand exceeded capacity, not every first preference could be accepted. Decisions about the organisation of educational services and the use of school linkages were principally matters for the local authority. The rearrangement was not irrational merely because it might disappoint more parents, particularly where compliance with the applicable rules was not challenged.
4. Final order. The proposed grounds disclosed no reasonable prospect of a successful judicial review application. The application was dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 8 February 2001, the court dismissed the application for permission to appeal and related further-evidence application: [2001] EWCA Civ 171.
2. Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court — Gibbs J made an order on 16 October 2000 refusing permission to apply for judicial review of the admission appeals panel’s decision.