Bradwell v Bradwell

On an application for permission to appeal, a challenge based chiefly on witness credibility requires a proper basis for appellate interference. Where the trial judge heard the witnesses, carefully assessed conflicting accounts and was entitled to prefer one, detailed challenges to documents or recollection do not justify reopening the factual findings. Procedural complaints and criticism of the language used to describe evidence will not suffice where they do not disclose material unfairness or error. Permission may therefore be refused where the proposed appeal identifies no arguable basis for disturbing the decision.

Pamela Bradwell challenged an order made by His Honour Judge Bowers in the Middlesbrough County Court on 21 June 2000. The order required Edith Bradwell to transfer a council house, purchased under right-to-buy arrangements, to Pamela, subject to Edith’s right to occupy it.

The county court found that the property had been purchased in Edith’s name for Pamela, that Pamela had contributed substantially towards the relevant payments, and that the arrangement gave rise to a constructive trust and proprietary estoppel. Pamela sought permission to appeal and permission to appeal out of time. The central issue was whether the proposed factual and procedural criticisms disclosed any sufficient basis for appellate intervention.

1. Disposition. Lord Justice Laws refused the applications for permission to appeal and to bring the appeal out of time.
2. The county court judge had treated the dispute as turning principally on which witness was reliable. He considered the evidence in detail, preferred Pamela’s account and rejected Edith’s account as unreliable. The Court of Appeal held that he was entitled to accept Pamela’s evidence and reject Edith’s evidence.
3. The judge had found an agreement that the house would be bought in Edith’s name for Pamela and transferred to her at the first convenient time after the restriction on resale ended. He also found substantial detrimental contributions by Pamela. On those findings, he held that there was a constructive trust and proprietary estoppel, and ordered transfer subject to Edith’s right to occupy.
4. The argument that Edith should receive credit because her tenant status enabled the 60 per cent discount could not succeed. The judge had expressly found an agreement to transfer the property, so the point did not undermine the decision.
5. Alleged inaccuracies in the mortgage application, differences concerning Pamela’s working hours and complaints about the trial procedure disclosed no sufficient ground of appeal. Although more moderate language might have been preferable when describing Edith’s evidence, that did not invalidate the judge’s assessment or establish procedural unfairness.

• Middlesbrough County Court: On 21 June 2000, His Honour Judge Bowers found for Pamela on the agreement, constructive trust, proprietary estoppel and detrimental reliance issues, and ordered transfer of the property subject to Edith’s right to occupy.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 23 October 2001, the court refused permission to appeal and permission to appeal out of time: [2001] EWCA Civ 1710.