Cikos & Ors v Secretary Of State For the Home Department

In a fact-rich asylum appeal, a further appeal requires an arguable error of law or procedure and a realistic prospect of success. Mere disagreement with an expert tribunal’s assessment of evidence and factual findings is insufficient. The state-protection principles established in Horvath and further explained in Noune remained the governing framework. The renewed applications for permission to appeal were therefore dismissed.

Three Czech Roma applicants sought permission to appeal the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s determination of 9 March 2001. The Tribunal had dismissed their appeals against special adjudicators’ decisions upholding refusals of asylum. The proposed grounds challenged the Tribunal’s assessment of evidence, its findings concerning risk from skinhead violence, and the adequacy of state protection under Horvath ([2000] Imm AR 552). The central issue was whether the proposed appeals disclosed an arguable error of law or procedure with a realistic prospect of success.

Applications dismissed. Simon Brown LJ held that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s lengthy and careful determination disclosed no realistic prospect of success on a further appeal. The proposed grounds principally challenged factual findings and sought to reargue the evidence. They did not identify an arguable error of law. The Tribunal had applied the governing state-protection principles in Horvath ([2000] Imm AR 552), as further explained in Noune, and its findings concerning future risk and the practical availability of protection were determinative.

The Court did not treat Katrinak or Harakel as requiring a different result. Those decisions turned on their individual facts, with Katrinak also involving essentially procedural questions. The Court declined to reopen the Tribunal’s factual assessment on that basis.

Schiemann LJ agreed. He adopted the approach expressed by Brook LJ in Josef Koller v Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2001] EWCA 1267): in fact-rich immigration jurisprudence, it was for the expert Tribunal to apply the principles stated by the House of Lords in Horvath. There was no mistake of law or procedural mistake and no point fit for a further appeal. All three applications were dismissed, with costs to be assessed in accordance with the Community Legal Service Regulations.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 1 November 2001, the renewed applications for permission to appeal were dismissed. [2001] EWCA Civ 1716.
2. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: The Tribunal’s determination of 9 March 2001 dismissed the applicants’ appeals.
3. Special adjudicators: The individual appeals against the Secretary of State’s refusals of asylum were dismissed.