London Borough Of Brent v Reynolds

Under section 348(1) of the Housing Act 1985, the power to impose management conditions on registration is separate from the power to refuse registration because the proposed manager is not a fit and proper person. Section 348(1)(d) does not qualify section 348(1)(b), and an authority need not consider conditional registration in every case of unfitness.

Conditions must genuinely relate to management. They cannot merely repeat statutory duties. On a complete rehearing, the county court must give substantial weight to the local housing authority’s assessment, the statutory purpose of protecting HMO occupants, and the consequences of unfitness. Financial loss to an unfit landlord cannot justify registration.

Brent refused to register 18 Lechmere Road as a house in multiple occupation managed by Mr Reynolds. Its decision relied on his recent convictions and failures to comply with housing enforcement notices. The county court found him not to be a fit and proper person, but allowed his appeal and ordered registration subject to compliance with statutory requirements.

Brent appealed from the Willesden County Court. It contended that the judge had wrongly treated section 348(1)(d) of the Housing Act 1985 as requiring consideration of conditional registration notwithstanding unfitness under section 348(1)(b). The central issue was the relationship between those two provisions and the proper approach on the statutory county-court appeal.

Appeal allowed. Buxton LJ, with whom Mummery LJ and Lord Woolf CJ agreed, held that the county court judge’s decision was founded on errors of law.

1. Section 348(1) of the Housing Act 1985 contains separate powers addressing different situations. Paragraph (a) concerns premises incapable of being made suitable. Paragraph (b) concerns an unfit proposed manager. Paragraph (c) permits works to make otherwise suitable premises suitable. Paragraph (d) permits management conditions only where registration is granted.

2. Section 348(1)(d) was an additional power introduced in 1996. It was not a proviso to paragraph (b), nor a means of registering an unfit manager subject to conditions. There was no requirement to consider paragraph (d) in every case falling within paragraph (b). Once the judge found Mr Reynolds unfit, the proper statutory course was refusal of registration for management by him.

3. The condition imposed by the judge was also ineffective. A requirement to obey pre-existing statutory obligations was not a condition relating to management within paragraph (d). It would expose the manager to duplicate consequences for the same statutory breach, including under section 348G(1).

4. The appeal to the county court was a complete rehearing, but the court had to give great attention to the authority’s view and be slow to disagree with it, consistently with [1971] 2 QB 614. The judge had wrongly found that Brent had not considered a probationary proposal, had failed to give proper weight to Brent’s policy and to the protection of tenants, and had treated the financial impact on Mr Reynolds as relevant despite his unfitness. The welfare of HMO occupants was a central statutory consideration, as recognised in (1999) 32 HLR 138.

5. The court substituted approval of the application only on condition that Mr Reynolds appoint a manager, and agree terms of appointment, acceptable to Brent. Brent could require reasonable monitoring and reporting, with the extra expense borne by Mr Reynolds. Brent was awarded costs summarily assessed at £20,000.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — allowed Brent’s appeal, set aside the county court’s conditional-registration order, and substituted an order requiring an acceptable manager. [2001] EWCA Civ 1843
• Willesden County Court — Judge Krikler allowed Mr Reynolds’s statutory appeal despite finding him unfit, and ordered registration subject to conditions. No citation is stated in the judgment.