The Queen (on the application of Chaudhry Zia Ullah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

When deciding whether to extend time for judicial review, the court should examine the reasons for the delay. An arguable injustice may justify an extension where delay resulted from unresolved immigration matters and the authority’s failure to disclose the reasoning underlying its decision. Refusing an extension in those circumstances may be erroneous, particularly where the applicant could not effectively challenge the decision without that reasoning. Granting permission for the matter to be examined does not determine the substantive merits.

The applicant had been served with notice in 1995 that he was an illegal entrant. He subsequently applied for asylum and remarried, and the relevant immigration matters were not completed until February 2000. He later discovered that the reasoning underlying the decision had apparently not been disclosed to him. Richards J considered that an injustice was arguable but refused to extend time because the judicial review proceedings had been brought too late. On a renewed application, the Court of Appeal considered whether that refusal was justified.

Disposition. Lord Justice Schiemann granted the renewed application for permission to move for judicial review.

1. Extension of time. Richards J had accepted that the applicant’s case disclosed an arguable injustice but concluded that the delay was too long. The Court of Appeal held that conclusion to be erroneous on the information before it. The delay up to February 2000 was explained by the applicant’s asylum application, remarriage and the continuing consideration by the immigration authorities. The later delay appeared attributable to the authorities’ failure to provide the reasoning for their decision once proceedings had begun.
2. Relevant approach. In deciding whether to extend time, the court must consider the circumstances causing the delay, including whether the applicant had access to the reasons necessary to challenge the decision. Where those circumstances coexist with an arguable injustice, the matter may properly be examined by the Administrative Court.
3. Merits. The grant of permission did not indicate that the applicant would succeed in the substantive judicial review. It established only that there was a sufficient matter to be considered.
4. Order. The case was to be examined by the Administrative Court. A public funding assessment was ordered.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On the renewed application, the court held that Richards J had erred in refusing to extend time and granted the application: [2001] EWCA Civ 1865.
• Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court): Richards J considered that an injustice was arguable but held that the applicant had waited too long to commence judicial review proceedings. No citation for that decision is stated in the judgment.