Sage v Ministry Of Defence

In a non-personal-injury claim, the extended limitation period under the Limitation Act 1980 does not await knowledge of the underlying cause of a condition, its full extent, or the defendant’s negligence. The claimant needs knowledge of the material damage and of its attribution to the complained-of act or omission, assessed against the statutory seriousness threshold. Where those facts are disputed, the section 14A issue should ordinarily be determined after evidence in one hearing. Causation also fails where undisclosed test results would have revealed no more than the claimant already knew.

The claimant, a former soldier, brought a second claim alleging that his employer had failed to tell him the results of hearing tests before his discharge. He alleged that this caused him to leave the army and suffer reduced employment prospects. Leicester County Court, before Mrs Recorder Harman, dismissed an application to strike out or obtain summary judgment, held that section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 applied, and found the claim was not time-barred. The earlier personal-injury hearing-loss claim had been struck out. The Ministry of Defence appealed all three decisions. The central issues were whether causation was reasonably arguable and whether the claimant acquired the statutory knowledge after 22 April 1996.

Lord Justice Dyson gave the judgment, with which Lord Justice Robert Walker and Lord Justice Aldous agreed. The appeal was unanimously allowed. The Recorder’s order was set aside and the second claim was dismissed with costs, subject to the stated enforcement and legal-aid assessment directions.

1. The alleged breach concerned failure to disclose the fact and extent of the claimant’s hearing loss, rather than its cause or treatment. The hearing tests in 1987 and 1988 would have disclosed no more about the extent of the loss than the claimant already knew. He therefore had no reasonable prospects of proving that the failure to inform caused him to leave the army.
2. The primary limitation period for the non-personal-injury claim was six years under sections 2 and 5 of the Limitation Act 1980. The cause of action accrued no later than discharge. The claim was therefore barred unless section 14A could be invoked.
3. Where the relevant facts are not admitted or agreed, the question whether section 14A can extend the limitation period should be determined by hearing the evidence. It should not be divided into an initial abstract question of applicability followed by a separate factual hearing.
4. For section 14A(6)(a), the material facts included the claimant’s hearing loss, the defendant’s knowledge of it from the tests, the failure to disclose the results, and the claimant’s departure from employment. The evidence showed that the claimant knew of a continuing and significant hearing problem before discharge. The tests merely measured that problem medically. His uncertainty about wax and the precise extent of the loss did not postpone knowledge.
5. The hearing loss was no less serious in 1987–89 than in 1996 or 1999. The claimant therefore had the material knowledge required by section 14A before 22 April 1996. He also knew before discharge that the defendant had failed to inform him of the loss. Under section 14A(8)(a), knowledge that the damage was attributable to that omission was sufficient. Knowledge that gunfire caused the underlying hearing loss was irrelevant.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2001] EWCA Civ 190, unanimously allowed the appeal, set aside the Recorder’s order, and dismissed the claim with costs.
• Leicester County Court — On 14 August 2000, Mrs Recorder Harman dismissed the strike-out or summary-judgment application, held that section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 applied, and held that the claim was not statute-barred.