Stevenson v Arora & Anor

Permission for a second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason. Serious allegations of fraud, perjury, miscarriage of justice or institutional bias do not meet that threshold when unparticularised and unsupported. Using an appeal to delay payment to creditors may also constitute an abuse of process. A complaint that a hearing proceeded in a party’s absence should ordinarily be raised before the hearing judge, or promptly by an application to set aside. The applicant must identify material suggesting that attendance could have affected the result. A party’s permission application need not be adjourned merely because a co-party is seeking leave under a civil proceedings order.

The trustee in bankruptcy sought an order for sale of the bankrupt’s property under section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 and section 335A of the Insolvency Act 1986. Mrs Arora claimed a 50 per cent beneficial interest. The bankruptcy Registrar rejected that claim and ordered a sale. Mr Justice Neuberger upheld the decision on 8 May 2001.

Mr Arora was later made subject to a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Mrs Arora alone pursued an application to show cause why the application for permission to appeal should not be struck out as an abuse of process. The central issues were whether the alleged absence from the High Court hearing justified permission or an adjournment, and whether the application should await Mr Arora’s separate application for leave.

Lord Justice Chadwick dismissed the application for permission to appeal. The application to show cause failed.

1. Section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 and CPR 52.13 required the applicants to show an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to entertain the second appeal.
2. The unparticularised allegations of miscarriage of justice, fraud, deception, perjury and institutional racism were unsupported by evidence. Making such allegations was an abuse of the court’s process, aggravated by the delaying effect or purpose of the appeal notice in postponing payment to creditors.
3. The order of 8 May 2001 showed that Mr Arora had appeared, sought an adjournment and made representations. It was realistic for the judge to regard him as speaking for both parties. Any separate application for an adjournment on Mrs Arora’s behalf should have been made to that judge. If she considered the order improperly made in her absence, she could have applied promptly to set it aside. No material had been produced suggesting that the Registrar’s conclusion on her alleged beneficial interest was wrong or might have been different had she attended.
4. Under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, Mr Arora could not pursue his application without High Court leave. No such leave had been obtained, and there was no reason to await it. Mrs Arora’s application concerned her own alleged beneficial interest and was distinct from the question whether the property should be sold despite her husband’s opposition.

Neither ground raised an important point of principle or practice or a compelling reason. The application for permission to appeal was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 13 December 2001, dismissed the application for permission to appeal: [2001] EWCA Civ 1944.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Mr Justice Neuberger upheld the bankruptcy Registrar’s decision on 8 May 2001.
• Bankruptcy Registrar: Mr Registrar James rejected Mrs Arora’s claimed beneficial interest and ordered the property’s sale on 20 February 2001.