Muya's Application for Judicial Review

In judicial review of an asylum adjudicator’s credibility assessment, the issue is whether the conclusion was irrational, not whether another evaluation of the evidence was available. An adjudicator may use common sense and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. The assessment may consider the absence of evidence specifically corroborating the claimant’s account, the risks and implausibility of the claimed escape route, and inconsistencies with documentary material. A criticism of one observation does not establish irrationality where the overall conclusion rests on a broader evidential foundation. The renewed application was therefore dismissed.

The applicant, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, sought asylum in the United Kingdom. A special adjudicator rejected important parts of his account of imprisonment, escape and travel to the United Kingdom, and concluded that he had not established refugee status. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal refused leave to appeal. On 24 May 2000, Tucker J refused permission to seek judicial review. The applicant renewed his application before the Court of Appeal, contending that the credibility findings were irrational. The central issue was whether the adjudicator’s assessment had a rational evidential foundation.

The renewed application for permission to appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal concluded that neither the special adjudicator nor the Immigration Appeal Tribunal had acted irrationally.

1. The applicant’s credibility was fundamental to his asylum claim. The adjudicator had heard his oral evidence, but there were no supporting witnesses, no documentation specifically relating to his account, no evidence establishing the existence of the alleged Zambian diplomat, and no evidence that the applicant’s sister had pressured him to assist.

2. The adjudicator was entitled to use common sense when assessing credibility. His view that a career diplomat would be unlikely to arrange an unlawful escape and entry into the United Kingdom, thereby risking his career and Zambia’s diplomatic relations, was not Wednesbury unreasonable. The absence of evidence supporting the alleged diplomat’s existence or the claimed pressure was relevant.

3. The adjudicator was also entitled to consider the claimed three- to four-day journey across the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the applicant allegedly feared persecution, rather than the much shorter route through Brazzaville. The applicant’s assertion that the UNTZ Union was illegal also conflicted with documentary evidence.

4. Material describing similar escapes in Flight into Exile did not specifically corroborate the applicant’s own account. The adjudicator’s reference to the absence of corroboration was properly understood in that limited sense. Any arguable criticism of that observation did not undermine the wider evidential foundation of the credibility assessment.

5. Tucker J had been right to refuse judicial review. There was no real prospect of success in an appeal. The formal order was: application dismissed, with a legal aid assessment of the applicant’s costs.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2001] EWCA Civ 203, Lord Justice Keene dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal.
2. Queen’s Bench Division: On 24 May 2000, Tucker J refused permission to seek judicial review of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s refusal to grant leave to appeal.
3. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: Refused leave to appeal against the special adjudicator’s determination.
4. Special adjudicator: Refused the applicant’s claim for asylum.