A, R (on the application of) v Hertfordshire County Council

A local authority conducting enquiries under Children Act 1989, section 47 may form a view that an individual presents a risk of significant harm to children. It may also communicate that view to another agency where it genuinely and reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to protect children and a court order is unnecessary.

The power arises by necessary implication from the authority’s statutory child-welfare responsibilities and inter-agency duties. Disclosure remains subject to judicial review. It must answer a pressing need and go no further than required for child protection.

The appellant was the head teacher of a residential school for boys with emotional and behavioural difficulties. Following concerns about his taking pupils on his barge, including an allegation of sexual assault of which he was acquitted, a multi-disciplinary social services strategy meeting concluded that he presented a risk of significant harm to children in his care.

The social services department communicated that conclusion to the local education authority, intending that it should reach the school governors. A judicial review challenge was dismissed by Maurice Kay J. The appeal concerned whether section 47 authorised the authority to form and communicate that view.

1. Appeal dismissed. The local authority was empowered under Children Act 1989, section 47 to form a view, following its enquiries, that a particular individual posed a risk of significant harm to children. Reaching that view could be a necessary part of deciding what protective action to take.
2. The authority also possessed, by necessary implication, power to communicate that conclusion to another agency. The power arose from the combined effect of the authority’s general child-welfare duty under section 17, the inter-agency framework under section 27, the section 47 investigation and consultation provisions, and Schedule 2, paragraph 4. The statutory scheme contemplated co-operation rather than separate institutional barriers.
3. The power was not unlimited. Disclosure required an honest and reasonable belief that it was necessary to protect children from the identified risk. The disclosure had to meet a pressing need and be no wider than required. Judicial review could control irrationality, procedural unfairness and excessive disclosure.
4. Re L and Re V (minors) (sexual abuse: disclosure) was materially different because it concerned the court’s control of confidential information arising in family proceedings. Its observations did not negate a local authority’s power to exchange necessary information. The approach in R v Local Authority and Police Authority in the Midlands, ex parte LM and R v Devon County Council, ex parte L was accepted. The principle in R v Chief Constable of North Wales Police, ex parte Thorpe that disclosure requires a pressing need was also adopted.
5. Lightman J added that both an underlying action decision and a later decision to communicate that decision by letter were reviewable. The authority had to consider whether the communication was proper and proportionate, having regard to its purpose and consequences. Appeal dismissed with costs; permission to appeal refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal from the decision of Maurice Kay J. dated 10 November 2000.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: dismissed the application for judicial review.