R (Stunt) v Mallett

For an injury award under the Police Pensions Regulations 1987, psychiatric illness may in principle result from cumulative occupational stresses. The inquiry is causal, not merely temporal. An event, condition or circumstance must impact directly on the officer while carrying out police duties and cause or substantially contribute to disablement. Execution of duty is not confined to active conduct, and work need not be the sole cause. However, illness caused by an officer’s reaction to disciplinary or investigative proceedings arises from his status as a constable, not from execution of duty. Continuing to work while the stress develops does not alter that characterisation. The appeal was allowed and the medical referee’s decision reinstated.

Mr Stunt, a former Metropolitan Police officer, was medically retired after suffering permanent psychiatric injury following an internal investigation into a complaint about his conduct. Dr Colthart and, on appeal, Dr Mallett concluded that the injury was not received in the execution of duty under the Police Pensions Regulations 1987.

On judicial review, Mr Justice Grigson quashed Dr Mallett’s decision. He held that submitting to the complaints procedure was itself part of a constable’s duty. The Commissioner appealed. The central issues were whether the psychiatric injury fell within regulation A11(1) or regulation A11(2)(a), and whether continuing to work while the investigation progressed was sufficient.

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously. Simon Brown LJ, with whom Longmore LJ agreed, and the Master of the Rolls concluded that Dr Mallett had not misdirected himself. The order of Mr Justice Grigson was set aside, and Dr Mallett’s decision was reinstated.
2. The Police Pensions Regulations 1987 distinguish between injury received in the execution of duty and disablement arising from infirmity more generally. Regulation A11(2) is a deeming provision and is not exhaustive. Regulation A11(1) may therefore apply even where regulation A11(2) does not. The expression execution of duty is not confined to an active act. It can include the fulfilment or discharge of the constable’s function or office.
3. The authorities beginning with Garvin v Police Authority for City of London [1944] 1 KB 358 and Police Authority for Huddersfield v Watson [1947] 1 KB 842 were rightly decided within their proper limits. The governing inquiry is whether events, conditions or circumstances impacted directly on the officer’s physical or mental condition while carrying out police duties and caused or substantially contributed to disablement. Causation is not to be applied legalistically. Work circumstances need not be the sole cause, but a connection with service is required; the officer’s status alone is insufficient.
4. Those principles did not assist Mr Stunt. His depression resulted from his reaction to the fact and conduct of the disciplinary investigation. His unavoidable and essentially passive subjection to the disciplinary process arose from his status as a constable. It did not constitute execution of duty. The Court expressly rejected the obiter dictum in R v Merseyside Police Authority, ex parte Yates, on which the judge below relied.
5. Mr Stunt’s alternative argument also failed. The fact that he continued to work while the investigation progressed did not show that being at work caused or exacerbated the illness. It would be artificial and unsatisfactory to distinguish between an officer who continued working and one who was suspended. The appeal was allowed with costs, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal: Allowed the Commissioner’s appeal, set aside the order below, reinstated Dr Mallett’s decision and awarded costs.
• High Court, Mr Justice Grigson: On 4 May 2000, allowed Mr Stunt’s judicial review challenge and quashed Dr Mallett’s decision, holding that submission to the complaints procedure fell within execution of duty.