Cleveland Police Authority & Anor, R (on the application of) v Knapper

For an injury to qualify as received in the execution of duty under regulation A11 of the Police Pensions Regulations 1987, the causal connection must be with service as a police officer, rather than merely with the person’s status as a police officer. Psychiatric illness caused by adverse publicity following failure to attend court was not sufficiently connected with the execution of duty. Regulation A11(2)(b) extends the ordinary scope of the provision to certain off-duty injuries caused by recognition as a constable, but does not cover circumstances outside any proper, even extended, meaning of execution of duty. The medical referee’s contrary decision was quashed.

The Cleveland Police Authority sought judicial review of a medical referee’s decision allowing Gary Knapper’s appeal against refusal of an injury-on-duty pension award. Mr Knapper, a police constable and prosecution witness, had failed to attend a criminal trial while on holiday. Adverse publicity followed, causing mental illness and eventual retirement on medical grounds.

The medical referee concluded that the illness was an injury received in the execution of duty under regulation A11(2)(b) of the Police Pensions Regulations 1987. The central issue was whether the circumstances fell within that provision, having regard to the Court of Appeal’s decision in R (Stunt) v Mallett [2001] ICR 989.

1. The application succeeded. The medical referee’s decision was quashed. The matter would technically require reconsideration by another medical referee if Mr Knapper wished to pursue the appeal.
2. Under regulation A11, the relevant causal connection must be with the person’s service as a police officer, and not simply with the fact that the person is a police officer. The court applied the approach in R (Stunt) v Mallett [2001] ICR 989, where psychiatric illness resulting from disciplinary proceedings was held not to be an injury received in the execution of duty.
3. Regulation A11(2)(b) can extend the ordinary meaning of execution of duty. It may cover an off-duty injury caused because the person is known to be a police officer, such as an assault arising from a grudge connected with police work or an off-duty intervention undertaken because of police status. It does not extend to an injury received in circumstances outside any proper, even extended, form of execution of duty.
4. The illness here resulted from adverse publicity because Mr Knapper, although required to attend court as a witness, did not attend. The relevant circumstances were not materially different from those in Stunt. The fact that the adverse publicity would not have occurred had he not been a police officer was insufficient. The same consequences could have followed for any witness required to attend court, with police status merely adding the possibility of disciplinary proceedings.
5. The earlier analysis in R v Kellam ex parte South Wales Police Authority [2000] ICR 632, as approved in Stunt, supported the requirement for a causal connection with service rather than status. The attempt to secure reconsideration under regulation H3 was misguided because an alleged misunderstanding of Stunt was not fresh evidence.
6. The fact that the medical referee was based in Scotland did not deprive the Administrative Court of jurisdiction. The proceedings concerned an English police authority, an English police officer and a decision forming part of a process conducted in England.

This was a first-instance judicial review claim. Permission had previously been granted by Harrison J, who considered the delay excusable. Mr Justice Collins then determined the merits and quashed the medical referee’s decision.