Camden Wines Ltd v Medlink International Incorporated

Service on a foreign company at the address recorded for its registered branch and authorised service representative is good service under Rule 6.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Knowledge that the premises had been sold or were no longer used for business did not invalidate service while the registered details remained unchanged. A default judgment may stand where the evidence shows no reasonable prospect of a defence. Further evidence that could not affect the outcome does not justify reopening the decision. Where the underlying claim and judgment remain valid, an application to discharge a related freezing order will ordinarily fail on the merits.

Camden Wines Ltd v Medlink International Incorporated concerned a claim by a company in liquidation to recover loans from a Nevada company, supported by promissory notes. The claim form was served at Ivy Cottage, the address recorded in the Companies registry for Medlink’s UK branch and authorised representative. Copies were also faxed to the United States. Medlink acknowledged service and indicated an intention to defend and contest jurisdiction, but served no defence and made no jurisdiction application. Default judgment exceeding £900,000 was entered.

Hallett J held that service was proper, refused to set aside the judgment, and continued a freezing order. Medlink challenged those conclusions and sought to adduce further evidence. The central issues were the regularity of service, the prospects of defending the claim, the continuation of the freezing order, and whether the further evidence could affect the outcome.

Lord Justice Aldous refused the applications.

1. Service. The address and representative recorded in the Companies registry remained the relevant details for service. The purpose of recording them was to enable service to be effected. Rule 6.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules made service at that address good service, despite the claimant’s knowledge that Ivy Cottage had been sold and was no longer used for business. The judgment was therefore regular.
2. Default judgment. Hallett J was entitled to exercise her discretion against setting aside the judgment. The evidence provided ample support for the conclusion that Medlink had no reasonable prospect of defending the claim. The proposed letters dated 22 March 2000 and 2 July 1998 added nothing material to the evidence already before the judge.
3. Freezing order. Since Medlink failed to strike out the claim or successfully challenge the judgment, the application to discharge the freezing order failed in principle. The debt and valid judgment justified continuation of the order on the merits. The technical objections had no real prospect of success.
4. Further evidence and governing law. The complaint concerning United States bankruptcy proceedings could not affect the issues before the court and was rejected as fresh evidence. Aldous LJ also observed, on an issue not dealt with below, that loans made in England were governed by English law.

Applications for permission to appeal and for permission to rely on fresh evidence were refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): [2001] EWCA Civ 284. Aldous LJ refused permission to appeal and permission to rely on fresh evidence.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Sheffield District Registry: Hallett J held that service was proper, refused to set aside the default judgment, and continued the freezing order.