Tassell & Anor v National Westminster Bank Plc

A statutory demand cannot be used to reopen issues already adjudicated and for which the avenues of appeal are exhausted. A further appeal is permissible only where it raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is some other compelling reason, under Access to Justice Act 1999, section 55. Reading papers before a hearing does not by itself demonstrate prejudgment. A refusal to adjourn or transfer proceedings may fall within ordinary case-management powers. A reference to the European Court of Justice requires a point warranting reference.

Mr and Mrs Tassell sought permission to appeal from an order made by a deputy judge of the Chancery Division in bankruptcy. The deputy judge had dismissed their appeal against a district judge’s refusal to adjourn or transfer the proceedings and to set aside a statutory demand for a bank judgment debt. The demand supported a bankruptcy petition.

They also sought a reference to the European Court of Justice under Article 234 and a stay of the bankruptcy petition. The central issue was whether their complaints disclosed an arguable further appeal or satisfied the statutory test for permission.

Application dismissed. Lord Justice Robert Walker refused permission to appeal. The applications for a reference and a stay consequently fell away.

1. The district judge’s refusal to grant an adjournment or transfer was well within his case-management powers. The fact that a judge has read the papers before a hearing does not mean that the judge has made up his mind in advance.
2. An application to set aside a statutory demand is not an opportunity to reopen issues which have already been adjudicated and in respect of which the avenues of appeal have been exhausted. The applicants’ complaints about earlier dealings with the Bank and alleged discrepancies in its records did not establish an arguable basis for setting aside the demand.
3. Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 imposes a binding and stringent restriction on a further appeal to the Court of Appeal. Permission is available only where the further appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or where there is some other compelling reason. Neither requirement was satisfied. Even applying the ordinary test, the proposed appeal was hopeless.
4. No point requiring a reference to the European Court of Justice under Article 234 had been identified. References to criminal-law provisions, the European Convention on Human Rights and related jurisprudence did not alter that conclusion.

The formal order was that the applications be dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2001] EWCA Civ 290, permission to appeal from the deputy judge’s order was refused and the associated applications fell away.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: The deputy judge dismissed the applicants’ appeal from the district judge’s refusal to adjourn or transfer the proceedings and to set aside the statutory demand.
• County court proceedings: The district judge refused the applications. The underlying judgment debt had previously been affirmed on appeal, and permission for a further appeal had been refused.