Lloyds TSB Bank Plc v McColl & Anor

Permission for a second-tier appeal from a county court decision is exceptional. Under the Access to Justice Act 1999, the Court of Appeal may hear such an appeal only where it raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason. The threshold is high. Human-rights submissions concerning a fair hearing did not satisfy it where the county-court judge had conducted the appeal fairly, including by considering points that a litigant in person might have overlooked. The application was therefore refused.

The bank obtained default judgment against Mrs McColl for sums alleged to be due and sought a charging order over her beneficial one-fifth share in property inherited from her late father. On 8 March 2000, Deputy District Judge Thomas declared that over £35,000 plus interest was due and made an order concerning sale of the share. His Honour Judge Moseley QC heard Mrs McColl’s appeal, together with a cross-appeal by the bank, on 10 October 2000. Mrs McColl then sought permission to appeal, alleging confusion, procedural unfairness and breaches of Articles 6 and 8. The central issue was whether the proposed second-tier appeal satisfied the statutory permission threshold.

Application refused. Lord Justice Thorpe dismissed Mrs McColl’s application for permission to appeal.

1. Section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 imposed a high hurdle. An appeal from a county court decision on an appeal could proceed only if it raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. The Human Rights Act 1998 applied to the county-court hearing. Articles 6 and 8 were the Convention provisions directly engaged. Mrs McColl’s complaint was principally that she had not received a fair trial and that the judge had favoured the represented party.
3. The court rejected that complaint. An experienced county-court judge hearing an appeal brought by a litigant in person would ordinarily use forensic skill to identify overlooked matters and arguments that could be advanced on the litigant’s behalf. Lord Justice Thorpe was satisfied that Judge Moseley had done so and had conducted a fair hearing.
4. There was therefore neither an important point of principle or practice nor any other compelling reason to justify a further appeal. The application would have had no better prospect even if presented by experienced counsel. The formal order was: application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 13 February 2001, Lord Justice Thorpe refused permission to appeal under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. The application was dismissed: [2001] EWCA Civ 465.
• County Court at Swansea: His Honour Judge Moseley QC heard Mrs McColl’s appeal and the bank’s cross-appeal on 10 October 2000. He dismissed Mrs McColl’s appeal.
• County Court: On 8 March 2000, Deputy District Judge Thomas declared that over £35,000 plus interest was due and made an order concerning sale of Mrs McColl’s beneficial share.