Mazrou, R (on the application) v Secretary Of State For the Home Department

Judicial review will not normally provide a useful remedy for a procedural error where the court is satisfied that the decision-maker would inevitably have reached the same conclusion. The court should assess that question by reference to the material that was before the decision-maker. A serious error in recording or considering the case may properly be criticised, but relief need not follow where correcting the error could not affect the outcome. The court should not remit a matter merely to require a decision-maker to repeat an inevitable decision.

An Algerian national sought asylum in the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State refused her application on credibility grounds, and a Special Adjudicator dismissed her appeal. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal refused leave to appeal, but mistakenly stated that the Special Adjudicator had heard oral evidence from the claimant.

Harrison J recognised the error but dismissed the judicial review claim, concluding that the refusal of leave would inevitably have been the same. Leave to appeal was granted to the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the Tribunal’s error required the matter to be remitted despite the court’s view that the outcome could not have differed.

1. The appeal and application for judicial review were dismissed. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal had made grave errors by recording that the claimant had given oral evidence and by apparently failing to read the Special Adjudicator’s determination with sufficient care. Those errors were properly identified and brought to the attention of the Tribunal’s Chairman.
2. The court nevertheless applied the principle that relief is not appropriate for a procedural irregularity where nothing of substance has been lost. The court also accepted that relief should not be granted where the decision would inevitably have been the same, relying on Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578 and Regina v Monopolies & Mergers Commission ex parte Argyll Group Plc [1986] 1 WLR 763.
3. The relevant question was whether, had the Tribunal appreciated that the claimant had not given evidence, it would nevertheless have refused leave to appeal. That question had to be determined on the material before the Tribunal, not on possible evidence or submissions that might be produced later.
4. The Special Adjudicator’s adverse credibility findings were clear and were based principally on inconsistencies concerning the claimant’s living arrangements, the date of her husband’s departure and the timing of attacks by the GIA. The issue of dress was only a minor consideration. The passport evidence provided further adverse material, although the Special Adjudicator had not relied materially upon it.
5. On that evidence, the Tribunal would have been bound to reach the same conclusion and refuse leave. Remittal would therefore serve no useful purpose. The claimant’s costs were to be assessed by the Community Legal Services.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2001] EWCA Civ 557: dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Harrison J: dismissed the judicial review claim on 7 July 2000, holding that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal would inevitably have reached the same decision.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: refused leave to appeal on 15 February 2000, but inaccurately recorded that the claimant had given oral evidence.
• Special Adjudicator: dismissed the asylum appeal on 31 January 2000 on credibility grounds.