Ogle v Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police

A claimant cannot pursue a further action for damages where an earlier settlement has compensated the same loss, even if the later claim relies on a different cause of action. The claim may be barred as an abuse of process where the parties are in a closely analogous position and the alleged damage is substantially the same.

A claim under section 22(1) of the Data Protection Act 1984 may in principle provide compensation for distress caused by inaccurate personal data. It must, however, identify a discrete head of distress independent of the arrest, detention or other loss already compensated.

The claimant brought three consolidated actions against the Chief Constable, including claims concerning wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and slander. District Judge Henson struck out the actions, and Buckley J dismissed the claimant’s appeal on 12 January 2000.

Permission was granted for a second-tier appeal only in relation to the wrongful-arrest action and the proposed claim under section 22(1) of the Data Protection Act 1984. The claimant had already accepted £950 in settlement from Surrey Police for the arrest, detention and embarrassment arising from the same incident. The central issue was whether a further claim against the Thames Valley Police could proceed for distress allegedly caused by the inaccurate police computer record.

1. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
2. Lord Justice Simon Brown held that damages for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment include any appropriate sum or uplift for distress caused by the arrest and detention. The claimant’s original pleading sought damages for wrongful arrest and loss of liberty arising from the inaccurate record. It disclosed no independently caused distress arising from the police’s failure to correct the record.
3. The settlement with Surrey Police therefore compensated the relevant loss. The claim was closely analogous to the principle in Jameson v CEGB [2000] 1 AC 455, and fell within the wider abuse-of-process principle identified in Kenburgh Investment (Northern) Ltd v Minton [2000] LLR PN 736.
4. Lord Justice Mance agreed in the result and added that the tort claim and the statutory claim were conceptually distinct causes of action. That distinction did not assist the claimant because the proposed amendment had no real prospect of establishing distress separate from the wrongful arrest and loss of liberty. It was an attempt to keep the action alive on a newly advanced and evidentially unsupported basis.
5. Simon Brown LJ observed that section 22(1) of the Data Protection Act 1984 could provide a better basis than negligence for a claim concerning an officer’s failure to correct inaccurate data. That observation could not assist a claimant whose loss had already been met.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed with costs.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Buckley J dismissed the claimant’s appeal against the District Judge’s strike-out order on 12 January 2000.
• District Judge: District Judge Henson struck out the three consolidated actions on 30 June 1999.