Paragon Finance Plc v Noueiri

On a second appeal, permission may be granted only where the case raises an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. Matters requiring evidence should ordinarily be raised at first instance and are not a proper basis for relief on a second appeal. In a long-running mortgage possession case, personal hardship and a hoped-for property sale did not justify interference without evidence of a realistic prospect of repayment. Unpaid interest may form part of the debt and, in some circumstances, attract further interest; that possibility alone did not make enforcement inequitable.

Paragon Finance provided Mr Noueiri with a secured variable-rate loan for the purchase of a leasehold property. Arrears accumulated, and possession orders and warrants were made over several years. On 24 November 2000, District Judge Dabezies refused to set aside possession orders and warrants and imposed a condition on further applications to suspend execution.

His Honour Judge Krikler dismissed Mr Noueiri’s appeal on 5 January 2001. Mr Noueiri applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to bring a second appeal, an extension of time and a stay of execution. The issues included the alleged inequity of interest on accumulated arrears, personal hardship, a possible sale of property in Lebanon and a proposed subpoena of the claimant’s directors.

Lord Justice Keene dismissed the application for permission to appeal and the associated applications for an extension of time and a stay of execution.

1. Under Part 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules, permission for a second appeal could be granted only if the case raised an important point of principle or practice, or there was another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. The defendant’s personal circumstances, including his illness and the damage to his property in Lebanon, had to be taken into account. However, the proceedings had continued for many years, and there was no evidence of a prospective purchaser or any realistic prospect of paying the substantial arrears. The county court judge’s conclusion therefore disclosed no basis for appellate interference.
3. The fact that unpaid interest accumulated into the amount owing, with interest potentially becoming payable on that accumulated sum in appropriate circumstances, did not make enforcement inequitable on the facts of the case.
4. The proposed stay was sought to enable the defendant to subpoena the claimant’s directors. The court was not persuaded that there was good reason for this. Any such matter should have been pursued at first instance, not on a second appeal.

There was no important point of principle or practice, no other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard and no realistic prospect of success. All applications were dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 24 April 2001, dismissed the application for permission to bring a second appeal, together with the associated applications. [2001] EWCA Civ 603
2. Willesden County Court — His Honour Judge Krikler dismissed the defendant’s appeal from the district judge’s decision on 5 January 2001.
3. Willesden County Court — District Judge Dabezies refused on 24 November 2000 to set aside possession orders and warrants and imposed a condition on further applications to suspend execution.