Das, R (on the application of) v London Rent Assessment Committee & Ors

In an out-of-time judicial review, an applicant must show a good reason for extending the applicable time limit. Research, correspondence, preparation, seeking legal assistance and looking for a suitable solicitor do not, without more, justify an extension where the deadline was known. A permission hearing need not be adjourned merely because the applicant considers the allotted time insufficient or wishes to await the commencement of the Human Rights Act 1998. A general assertion of an unfair hearing does not establish an Article 6.1 issue where the procedure was fair and an opportunity for consultation was available.

Mr Das, a tenant, challenged fair-rent decisions made by a rent officer and the London Rent Assessment Committee. His judicial review application was filed more than four months outside the applicable three-month period. Burton J refused permission on paper, and an oral hearing was later listed before Owen J.

Owen J refused Mr Das’s request to adjourn the hearing and dismissed his renewed application for permission. Mr Das sought permission to appeal, relying on the delay, the time allowed for the hearing, and a proposed Article 6.1 challenge after the commencement of the Human Rights Act 1998. The central issues were whether time should be extended, whether the hearing should be adjourned, and whether the underlying claim had any realistic prospect of success.

Disposition. Lord Justice Rix, giving the judgment of the court, dismissed the application for permission to appeal.

1. The judicial review application was lodged outside the three-month period. Mr Das knew of that time limit by 5 May 1999. His explanations included research, correspondence with the court and Committee, attempts to find a solicitor, seeking legal aid, preparing papers and drafting the application. Those matters did not establish a good reason for extending time. In substance, he had prepared the application at his own pace rather than seeking to comply with a known deadline. The court saw no justification for extending the period to nearly seven and a half months.
2. There was no sufficient reason to adjourn the permission hearing before Owen J. Although the hearing had initially been listed for 20 minutes, that period was sufficient for the judge to deal with the matter. Mr Das was not entitled to postpone the hearing until the anticipated commencement of the Human Rights Act 1998.
3. The court found no procedural unfairness in the proceedings and no Article 6.1 point. In relation to the rent officer, the papers showed that Mr Das had been told of a right to request a meeting or consultation, but no such request was made.
4. To the extent the underlying grounds were considered, the court agreed that they had no realistic prospect of success. The application for permission to appeal was therefore dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lord Justice Rix dismissed the application for permission to appeal on 30 April 2001: [2001] EWCA Civ 648.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Owen J refused an adjournment and dismissed the renewed application for permission for judicial review on 12 May 2000.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Burton J refused permission on paper on 2 October 1999, finding no sufficient grounds for the delay and no realistic prospect of success.