R (Ullah (Azad)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

British citizenship under the British Nationality Act 1981 is a unitary status. The distinction between citizenship by descent and citizenship otherwise than by descent affects the citizenship of children born outside the United Kingdom, not the status of the parent. Section 6 permits an application to become a British citizen by naturalisation. It does not permit an existing British citizen by descent to acquire a different class of citizenship. Section 14 confirms that a person within its definition remains a citizen by descent unless Parliament has provided otherwise. Anomalies or perceived unfairness in the statutory scheme cannot justify rewriting the Act. The registration route for qualifying children is the remedy chosen by Parliament.

The respondent was a British citizen by descent under the British Nationality Act 1981. He wished to be naturalised as a British citizen otherwise than by descent so that children born abroad could acquire British citizenship automatically.

The Secretary of State declined to accept the application, considering that an existing British citizen was ineligible for naturalisation. Gibbs J, in the Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative and Divisional Court), held that section 6 did permit the application and granted judicial review. The Secretary of State appealed. The central issue was whether section 6 permitted a British citizen by descent to acquire citizenship otherwise than by descent through naturalisation.

Appeal allowed unanimously, with costs. The application for judicial review was refused.

1. The British Nationality Act 1981 is concerned with the acquisition, renunciation and resumption of citizenship status. It does not establish a hierarchy of British citizenship. British citizenship is therefore a unitary status unless clear statutory language indicates otherwise.
2. The distinction between citizenship by descent and citizenship otherwise than by descent concerns the position of children born outside the United Kingdom. It does not create a different status for the parent. The respondent remained a British citizen by descent under section 14.
3. The structure of the Act supported that conclusion. Section 4 made express provision for transfer between specified categories of citizenship, but contained no provision for transfer between alleged classes of British citizenship. Section 42(5) assumed that naturalisation made a person a British citizen from the date of the certificate. The deprivation provisions in section 40 would operate incoherently if an existing citizen could obtain naturalisation.
4. Section 14’s definition, using the words “if and only if”, was an insuperable obstacle to the respondent’s argument. Even if a certificate of naturalisation were granted, he would remain within section 14(1)(b)(i). The word “as” in section 6 therefore carried the meaning of becoming a British citizen. Section 6 did not apply to a person who already held that status.
5. The registration provisions in section 3 supplied Parliament’s chosen remedy for qualifying children born abroad. Any anomalies or apparent unfairness in that scheme could not justify rewriting section 6.
6. Mr Justice Lloyd observed that, after renouncing citizenship under section 12, a person could apply for naturalisation, but the Secretary of State could consider the alternative route of resumption under section 13. Lord Justice Judge added that it could be lawful, subject to the individual circumstances, to refuse naturalisation sought solely to circumvent the statutory disadvantage. These observations were additional to the ratio.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — In [2001] EWCA Civ 659, the court unanimously allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal, refused judicial review and awarded costs.
• Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative and Divisional Court) — Gibbs J held that section 6 of the British Nationality Act 1981 permitted a British citizen by descent to apply for naturalisation.