Keyse v Commissioner Of Police For Metropolis & Anor

An emergency-service driver remains subject to the duty to take reasonable care. Whether that duty has been breached depends on all the circumstances. Exceeding a speed limit, although potentially criminal, does not by itself establish civil negligence.

Clear emergency warnings may materially affect the reasonable standard of driving. A driver using conspicuous lights and a siren may normally assume that road users will recognise the vehicle’s approach and give it priority. The driver must still respond reasonably to foreseeable risks, but need not drive on the footing that a pedestrian will unexpectedly ignore those warnings and enter the vehicle’s path.

The claimant pedestrian was seriously injured when he was struck at night by a marked police response car travelling to an immediate burglary call. The car displayed flashing blue lights, used a two-tone siren and entered the junction on a green light. The pedestrian crossed its path while hurrying to catch a bus.

His Honour Judge Hutton, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge in the Queen’s Bench Division, found the police driver negligent and reduced damages by 25% for the pedestrian’s contributory negligence. The defendants appealed against primary liability and, alternatively, the apportionment.

The central issue was whether the police driver’s speed through the junction amounted to negligence when assessed in the circumstances of an urgent, clearly signalled emergency response.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Justice Judge held that the judge had wrongly treated the driver’s excess speed, and the resulting inability to stop before impact, as sufficient to establish liability.

2. The statutory exemptions for emergency vehicles from speed, keep-left and traffic-light offences did not authorise negligent driving or remove civil liability. Under Road Traffic Regulations Act 1984 and the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 1994, the driver’s duty to take reasonable care remained undiminished.

3. The court accepted the duty stated in Gaynor v Allen, [1959] 2 QB 403, but held that its suggested comparison with an ordinary driver on a private journey was no longer an accurate statement of the applicable standard. Consistently with Marshall v Osmond, [1983] QB 1034, the required care was that which was reasonable in all the circumstances.

4. A material circumstance was that an emergency driver using conspicuous lights and sirens could normally expect pedestrians to recognise the vehicle’s imminent approach and keep clear. Such warnings could justify a speed greater than that appropriate for an unmarked vehicle or a private motorist facing an emergency.

5. Here the road was clear, the traffic lights favoured the police car, and the pedestrian’s entry into its path without a further look was not a risk the driver had to anticipate by proceeding at a speed which would have avoided it. Hard acceleration through the unobstructed junction was not unreasonable. Lord Justice Latham and Mr Justice Lloyd agreed. There was no order for the appellants’ costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the defendants’ appeal and set aside the finding that the police driver was liable in negligence.
• Queen’s Bench Division: His Honour Judge Hutton, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge, had found the driver negligent and reduced the claimant’s damages by 25% for contributory negligence.