Warsama v London Fire Brigade

An emergency vehicle driver owes road users the same duty as any other driver. The driver may generally assume that pedestrians will recognise audible and visual warnings and keep clear, but must still drive at a speed and with a level of care proportionate to the circumstances. The statutory speed limit does not remove that duty. In assessing negligence, the court applies the standard of the reasonable, not ideal, driver and avoids hindsight and undue reliance on precise accident-reconstruction calculations. Contributory negligence requires comparison of each party’s blameworthiness and the causative potency of their conduct. A pedestrian’s serious responsibility does not prevent a finding that an emergency driver was also negligent.

The claimant suffered serious injury when struck by the wing mirror of the defendant’s fire appliance on Commercial Road, London. The appliance was responding to an emergency call with its siren and flashing lights activated. The claimant had moved from the pavement, through a bus lane and into the appliance’s carriageway. She accepted some responsibility.

The issues were whether the driver had driven negligently, particularly by travelling too quickly and failing to brake sooner, and, if so, the appropriate reduction for contributory negligence.

1. The claim succeeded, subject to 50% contributory negligence. The driver owed the claimant the ordinary duty of a reasonable and careful driver. An emergency driver may normally assume that road users will recognise warning lights and sirens and give the vehicle priority, but that assumption does not eliminate the duty to allow for hazards and to drive safely.

2. Section 87 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 disapplied the statutory speed limit for the emergency vehicle, but the driver remained required to exercise care and skill proportionate to the speed at which he drove. The standard was that of a reasonable, rather than ideal, driver, assessed without hindsight and by reference to practical realities.

3. The driver was travelling at about 45 mph. That was too fast for this part of Commercial Road, having regard to its night-time activity, the large group of pedestrians, the central reservation, parked vehicles, the vehicle’s size, damp conditions and the driver’s limited ability to manoeuvre or brake safely. Once the claimant emerged from between the parked vehicles and appeared to be a potential hazard, he should have begun braking. Heavy or emergency braking was effectively his only available evasive response. His failure to do so was negligent and causative.

4. The accident-reconstruction calculations were indicative only. They did not establish negligence by themselves because they depended on assumptions about speed, perception-response time and the claimant’s movements.

5. Under section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the court compared the parties’ blameworthiness and the causative potency of their conduct. The claimant entered the carriageway while affected by alcohol and cannabis, misjudged the approaching fire appliance and placed herself in obvious danger. Her contribution was therefore assessed at 50%.