Wildig v Bournemouth Borough Council

An application to reinstate a long-dismissed application for leave to appeal, or alternatively to obtain permission, requires an adequate explanation for delay and sufficient material justifying the exercise of discretion. Where alleged procedural difficulties have been resolved, the applicant must act with reasonable promptness. Unsupported allegations of conspiracy or procedural impropriety, coupled with prolonged unexplained inactivity, do not satisfy that threshold. The application may therefore be refused despite the applicant’s strong personal sense of grievance.

The applicant claimed damages of approximately £60,000 from Bournemouth Borough Council for alleged unlawful interference with antiques and valuables. A district judge dismissed the claim in May 1991 and refused leave to appeal. An order made by His Honour Judge Jack in July 1991 stated that the appeal was dismissed, although the applicant maintained that the hearing had been adjourned for a full hearing.

The Court of Appeal summarily dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to appeal and an extension of time in July 1992, in his absence. After further correspondence and substantial periods of inactivity, he sought reinstatement of that application or permission to appeal. The central issue was whether the delay and the material relied on justified reopening the matter.

Lord Justice Judge gave the judgment of the court. The application was considered either as an application to reinstate the earlier application for leave to appeal or as a fresh application for permission. On either basis, it failed.

1. The applicant had not provided an adequate explanation for the prolonged delay. Although he relied on difficulties in obtaining the judge’s notes, he appeared to have obtained those notes by February 1994. Nothing then prevented him from returning to the court, but there was no sufficient evidence of effective action during 1993 or thereafter.
2. The court treated the long periods during which the litigation was allowed to remain dormant as materially adverse to the application. The explanation based on obstruction, fraud and difficulties with the legal system did not account for the delay.
3. The allegations that the notes or judgment had been falsified through a conspiracy were unsupported by independent material in the papers. The alleged document by which the respondent had accepted liability and quantum appeared wholly improbable in light of the procedural history.
4. There was no sufficient material to justify reinstating the application for leave to appeal after so many years. The application was therefore refused, notwithstanding the applicant’s sense of grievance.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division)—the applicant’s application for leave to appeal and an extension of time was summarily dismissed in July 1992, in his absence, with costs.
2. County Court—a district judge dismissed the claim in May 1991 and refused leave to appeal. An order made by His Honour Judge Jack in July 1991 stated that the appeal was dismissed, although the applicant disputed that account.
3. Court of Appeal (Civil Division)—in [2001] EWCA Civ 738, the court refused the application to reinstate the earlier proceedings or, alternatively, to grant permission to appeal.