Gauhar Ondapbergenova - v - John Allan Bramley-Fenton

Under Access to Justice Act 1999, section 55(1), a further appeal to the Court of Appeal after a matter has been decided on appeal by a High Court judge requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason. The threshold is exceptional. Complaints about late evidence should ordinarily be addressed by seeking an adjournment. Where no adjournment was sought, and the judge was entitled to attach some weight to hearsay evidence, the complaint will not ordinarily establish a compelling reason absent fundamental injustice.

The proceedings concerned competing claims to exclusive occupation of a former matrimonial home. A district judge decided in favour of the respondent. The mother appealed, and Mr Justice Munby QC, sitting in the Family Division, exercised his discretion in the opposite direction. A renewed application for permission to appeal was then made to the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the statutory threshold for a further appeal had been met, including in relation to late evidence admitted by the High Court judge.

1. Application refused. The renewed application for permission to appeal was dismissed.
2. Statutory threshold. The matter had already received an appeal hearing before a High Court judge. Section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 therefore applied. A further appeal required either an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. The provision was intended to prevent routine onward appeals and imposed an exceptional threshold.
3. Late evidence. Complaints that evidence was introduced late should ordinarily be met by an application for an adjournment. If an adjournment is refused, the Court of Appeal might intervene where refusal caused fundamental injustice. No adjournment had been sought in this case. The evidence was therefore before the judge for consideration.
4. Weight of evidence and discretion. Although some of the evidence was hearsay, including written reports, the judge was entitled to give it some weight. The underlying dispute involved severe hardship for either party, but the difficulty and discretionary nature of the decision did not raise an important point of principle or practice. Nor was there another compelling reason for a further appeal. The formal order was: application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 9 May 2001, the court refused the renewed application for permission to appeal under section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999: [2001] EWCA Civ 744.
2. High Court of Justice, Family Division: Mr Justice Munby QC heard the mother's appeal from the district judge and exercised his discretion in the opposite direction.
3. District judge: The initial decision concerning exclusive use of the former matrimonial home was made in favour of the respondent.