Clarkson v Gilbert & Ors

A contractual power to suspend a member of an association is not confined to professional competence where the governing contract contains no such restriction. It may extend to conduct that significantly hampers the association’s functioning. Where suspension is contractually authorised, claims for inducing breach of contract and conspiracy by unlawful means lack an arguable foundation. A lawful-means conspiracy requires evidence that the defendants’ predominant purpose was to harm the claimant, rather than to protect legitimate organisational interests. A libel claim brought outside the limitation period requires evidence of republication within time. Procedural service defects do not justify discretionary relief where the underlying claim has no merit.

The claimant, a founding member of the Gestalt Psychotherapy Training Institute, was suspended by its executive council after disputes with other members. An internal appeal upheld the suspension. She brought claims against 19 members for inducing breach of contract, conspiracy by unlawful and lawful means, and libel against one defendant.

Mr Justice Eady dismissed claims against some defendants because of defects in service and entered judgment under Part 24 against others. The claimant applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal, challenging the contractual basis for suspension, the conspiracy analysis, the limitation finding on libel, and the treatment of the service defects.

Application refused. Lord Justice Latham held that the proposed appeals had no real prospect of success.

1. The contract constituted by the Institute’s memorandum and articles did not restrict the executive council’s suspension power to breaches of professional standards or competence. The Institute was one of several bodies forming an overarching system for governing psychotherapists, and was not the only body capable of granting qualifications required for practice. The council was therefore entitled to conclude that the claimant’s conduct significantly hampered the Institute’s functioning and to suspend her on that basis.
2. Because the suspension was within the contractual powers conferred on the council, there was no properly arguable breach of contract. The claims for inducing breach of contract and conspiracy by unlawful means consequently had no viable foundation.
3. The evidence did not provide an arguable case of conspiracy by lawful means. It showed that the defendants were concerned with protecting the interests of the Institute, rather than acting solely to harm the claimant.
4. Even assuming substance in the libel claim, it was brought after the expiry of the limitation period. The claimant had to show that the libel was republished within the relevant period. There was no evidence of such republication.
5. Although procedural defects in service might have supported an exercise of discretion if the claims had merit, the absence of merit in the underlying claims provided no justification for exercising that discretion in the claimant’s favour.

Permission to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The claimant’s application for permission to appeal was refused: [2001] EWCA Civ 766.
• High Court: Mr Justice Eady dismissed claims against some defendants for service defects and entered judgment under Part 24 against others.