Noh v London Borough Of Hammersmith and Fulham

For intentional homelessness under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996, the question is whether it was reasonable for the applicant to continue occupying the accommodation, judged when it was left. The local housing authority must assess the applicant’s individual circumstances and balance them against the general housing circumstances permitted by section 177(2), including housing shortages and pressure on resources. Medical evidence must be considered, but the statutory judgment remains for the authority, which need not adopt an expert’s conclusion on reasonableness. On an appeal under section 204, the court intervenes only where the authority’s conclusion is perverse or one no reasonable decision-maker could reach. The decision-maker must read the decision as a whole; isolated references to necessity do not establish a legal misdirection.

The appellant, a Somali mother with three children, had been housed by Newham at 27 Linton Gardens. She left that accommodation and later sought assistance from Hammersmith and Fulham after living temporarily with her sister. The authority treated her as intentionally homeless under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 because it considered the former accommodation reasonable to continue occupying, despite medical evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.

On review, the authority maintained its decision. The Clerkenwell County Court dismissed her appeal under section 204 on 20 December 1999. The Court of Appeal considered whether the authority had applied the correct statutory test and whether its conclusion was perverse in light of the appellant’s medical and social circumstances and the prevailing housing conditions.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lady Justice Arden gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Mummery and the President agreed.

1. Under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996, the relevant issue was whether it would have been reasonable for the appellant to continue occupying the accommodation, assessed when she left it. The issue was not whether it had been reasonable for her to leave. The Court followed the approach in R v RB Kensington & Chelsea ex parte Bayani [1990] 22 HLR 406.
2. The authority had to consider the appellant’s individual circumstances and balance them against general housing circumstances under section 177(2). It was entitled to consider housing shortages, housing stock, waiting lists, existing priorities, the ability to accommodate another family unit, transport, and the demands on its resources. The local authority was best placed to assess the general conditions, consistent with R v London Borough of Newham ex parte Tower Hamlets [1991] 23 HLR 62 and R v Brent London Borough Council ex parte Bariise [1999] 31 HLR 50.
3. On an appeal under section 204, the court should leave factual and evaluative questions to the authority. Intervention was justified only if the decision was perverse or one which no reasonable decision-maker could have reached, applying R v London Borough of Hillingdon ex parte Puhlhofer [1986] 1 AC 484.
4. Medical evidence was relevant, but the authority was not bound by an expert’s opinion on the ultimate statutory question of reasonableness. It could accept the diagnosis while reaching its own conclusion on the housing question. Although section 3 of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 did not apply to Part VII decisions, the guidance in Re M and R [1996] 2 FLR 195 was useful by analogy.
5. Read as a whole, the authority’s decision applied the correct test. Its reference to whether living nearer the appellant’s relatives was essential did not replace the statutory question. The authority had considered the medical evidence, family support, travel, accommodation suitability, and housing conditions. R v Brent London Borough Council ex parte Omar [1991] 23 HLR 446 was distinguishable because it involved materially different and more extensive medical evidence, including a suicide risk. The decision was not perverse. The appeal was dismissed, with no order for costs and legal aid assessment.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) On 26 April 2001, the court unanimously dismissed the appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996. [2001] EWCA Civ 905.
2. Clerkenwell County Court His Honour Judge Reid QC dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the authority’s review decision by order dated 20 December 1999.
3. London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham The authority refused housing assistance on 11 May 1999 and maintained that decision on review on 13 August 1999, concluding that the appellant had become intentionally homeless.