Chitolie v Rona Property Investment Company Ltd

A second appeal requires permission and is available only where the proposed appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or where some other compelling reason exists. Applications that merely seek to reopen matters already considered and finally disposed of have no real prospect of success and do not satisfy that threshold. The court may consider a restraining order against repetitive or hopeless applications, but the making of such an order should ordinarily be addressed by an appropriate High Court judge where the application concerns Chancery or bankruptcy proceedings.

Mr Chitolie made two applications. The first sought permission to appeal, together with an extension of time, from an order of Mr Peter Leaver QC dismissing his appeal against the refusal to set aside a statutory demand. The second sought permission to appeal from Mr Justice Pumfrey’s dismissal of his appeal against a bankruptcy order.

Both applications arose from a costs liability imposed after proceedings concerning leasehold property. Mr Chitolie had already challenged the underlying order before a High Court judge and had been refused permission to appeal by the Court of Appeal. He sought to raise substantially the same complaints in the statutory-demand and bankruptcy proceedings.

The central issues were whether either proposed second appeal met the statutory permission threshold and whether a restraining order should be made in relation to further applications.

1. Applications refused. Both proposed appeals were second appeals. Under Access to Justice Act 1999, section 55, permission could be granted only if an appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or if there were some other compelling reason.

2. The applications had no prospect of success. The complaints concerned an order which had already been considered on numerous occasions, including in detail by Mr Justice Pumfrey. There was no evidence supporting the allegation that a mistaken case number had been used deliberately or deceitfully. The points concerning VAT registration details and courier fees had also been repeatedly considered. Mr Justice Pumfrey had been entitled to conclude that the bankruptcy order was neither unlawful nor irregular.

3. The underlying order could not be reopened indirectly through later statutory-demand or bankruptcy proceedings after the direct route of appeal had ended. The applications therefore failed both the ordinary permission standard and, more plainly, the higher standard applicable to second appeals.

4. The court considered whether to make a restraining order under the jurisdiction established or illustrated by Grepe v Loam (1887) 37 Ch D 168, with reference also to Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484. No order was made by the single Lord Justice because it was more appropriate for any such order to be considered by a High Court judge.

5. The applications were dismissed. The formal order was: application refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Direct permission to appeal from Master Bragge’s order was refused by Lord Justice Mummery on 28 March 2000.
• Chancery Division, High Court: Mr Peter Leaver QC dismissed the appeal from the refusal to set aside the statutory demand.
• Chancery Division, High Court: Mr Justice Pumfrey dismissed the appeal from the bankruptcy order on 31 January 2001.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The present applications for permission to appeal and an extension of time were refused.