Igwemma v Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police

After a civil jury has returned answers, the judge retains a discretion to permit correction, even after discharging the jury, where the interests of justice require it. The discretion must be exercised cautiously and with regard to the integrity of the trial process.

The principal considerations are the time elapsed, the reason advanced for reopening the answers, whether the jury itself promptly identifies a genuine mistake or misunderstanding, and whether anything said or done after the original answers may have influenced the jury. Discharge is relevant but is not automatically decisive. A formal rule that a discharged jury can never correct its verdict is unjustified.

The claimant brought proceedings against the Chief Constable for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution arising from his arrest and detention. Four questions were put to a civil jury. The jury initially answered all four in the affirmative, which defeated the false-imprisonment claim but established malicious prosecution.

After the jury had been told that its function was complete, the foreman indicated that the jury had misunderstood the fourth question. The judge permitted the jury to retire briefly and reconsider that answer. The jury then unanimously answered the fourth question negatively, with the result that the malicious-prosecution claim also failed.

The claimant appealed from the decision of H.H. Judge Tetlow in the Manchester County Court. The central issue was whether the judge had been entitled to permit the jury to alter an answer after the verdict had been returned and the jury discharged.

1. Appeal dismissed. The judge was entitled to set aside the discharge and permit the jury to rectify its answer to question 4.
2. The court’s objective in a jury trial is to do justice between the parties without unnecessary delay or expense. The jury’s findings must be accurately transmitted to and understood by the court. If there has been, or may have been, a misunderstanding, it should be investigated and corrected where this can occur without injustice.
3. The governing approach is discretionary rather than subject to an automatic nullity rule. The judge must consider the interests of justice and the integrity of the trial process. Relevant factors include:
   • the time elapsed since the original answers;
   • why further assistance from the jury is sought, including whether the jury itself identifies a plausible misunderstanding;
   • whether the jury may have been influenced by anything said or done after the original answers, particularly material that would not ordinarily have been heard during the trial;
   • in a civil case, the implications for costs; and
   • the fact of discharge, which is relevant but not critical in itself.
4. It was appropriate to correct the answer in this case. The time elapsed was short. The jury itself raised the possibility of misunderstanding. Question 4 was capable of causing confusion despite the judge’s direction. The jury had not separated or heard inadmissible material, and the judge confirmed that questions 1 to 3 were not being reopened.
5. The broad proposition attributed to Alowi, that a discharged jury cannot return a verdict resulting from further debate, was described as obiter and was not supported by the authorities. It imposed an unnecessary fetter on judicial discretion.

• Court of Appeal: [2001] EWCA Civ 953. Appeal from the Manchester County Court dismissed.
• Manchester County Court: The jury’s corrected answer caused the claimant’s malicious-prosecution claim to fail; the false-imprisonment claim had already failed on the jury’s answers.