Gairy v Attorney General of Grenada

The supplied text records that, where an applicant abandons the original grounds of an appeal and seeks, out of time, to substitute new matters aimed at reopening litigation below, the court may refuse leave to amend. This is appropriate where the proposed matters are unsuitable for an appeal and have no realistic prospect of success. If amendment is refused and no original ground remains, there is no basis on which permission can be granted. The key information identifies a different case and court from the supplied text; these propositions are drawn solely from the supplied text.

The key information identifies Gairy v Attorney General of Grenada, [2001] UKPC 30. The supplied text instead records an application by Michael Marshall Hellyer for permission to appeal from a Divisional Court order made on 7 March 2001. The order was a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The applicant filed his application for permission on 20 March 2001, then sought to replace his original grounds with wholly different matters out of time. He accepted that the original grounds were not worth pursuing. The central questions were whether leave to amend should be granted and whether the proposed grounds disclosed any realistic prospect of success.

The supplied text records that Lord Justice Kay refused permission to appeal.

1. The original grounds were read in detail and were considered to have no prospect of success. The applicant did not wish to pursue them.
2. The proposed replacement grounds were raised well out of time and sought to reopen issues litigated in the proceedings that had led to the civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Leave to amend was refused. The proposed matters were inappropriate for consideration on an appeal and, even if considered, had no prospect of success.
3. The proposed matters did no more than demonstrate the correctness of the order below. The applicant’s conduct of the permission application was itself consistent with the need for such an order.
4. Because the original grounds were abandoned and leave to introduce the new matters was refused, nothing remained on which permission could be granted. The application for permission to appeal was therefore refused.

The key information identifies the source as a Privy Council decision, whereas the supplied text records an England and Wales Court of Appeal application.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2001] EWCA Civ 1168 on 19 June 2001, Lord Justice Kay refused permission to appeal.
• Divisional Court: On 7 March 2001, made a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, declaring the applicant a vexatious litigant.