Barnet London Borough Council v Hurst (Practice Note)

The appellate route in contempt proceedings depends on the order appealed from and whether the appeal is a first or second appeal. A committal order made by a circuit judge in a county court is appealable to the Court of Appeal as of right. Other contempt decisions require permission. A first appeal from a district judge will ordinarily lie within the county court, subject to exceptional transfer.

A sentence for breach of an undertaking must reflect the conduct admitted or proved. Civil contempt jurisdiction remains separate from criminal proceedings arising from the same facts. Breaches should ordinarily be addressed swiftly and effectively, although an adjournment may be justified by a real risk of prejudice causing injustice.

The council obtained undertakings from Mr Hurst concerning anti-social behaviour at a residential block. After a later disturbance, it sought his committal for breach and further injunctive relief.

At Barnet County Court, Her Honour Judge Bevington accepted a limited admission that Mr Hurst had been loud and noisy, sentenced him to nine months’ imprisonment, and adjourned the balance of the committal application pending related criminal proceedings. Mr Hurst appealed against sentence. The council cross-appealed against the adjournment.

The Court of Appeal considered the proper appeal routes in committal proceedings, the interaction between civil contempt and parallel criminal proceedings, and whether the sentence was excessive.

1. The appeal against sentence was allowed to a limited extent. The nine-month term was manifestly excessive for the conduct covered by Mr Hurst’s limited admission. A term of three months’ imprisonment was substituted.

2. Per Lord Justice Brooke, with whom Lord Justice Dyson and Lord Justice Simon Brown agreed, the general appellate provisions of Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Part 52 operate subject to special provisions. Under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960, a first appeal from a committal order made by a circuit judge in the county court lies to the Court of Appeal as of right. An appeal from another county-court decision made in the exercise of contempt jurisdiction also lies there, but requires permission.

3. A first appeal from a district judge’s committal order will ordinarily lie to a circuit judge within the county court. Exceptionally it may reach the Court of Appeal through the transfer machinery. A second appeal lies to the Court of Appeal only under the second-appeal regime and always requires permission, because the order then appealed from is not itself a committal order.

4. The court had jurisdiction over both appeals and granted permission for the council’s cross-appeal. It made no order on that cross-appeal because the criminal prosecution had ended without evidence being called, so the issue had become academic.

5. The court nevertheless confirmed, as guidance, that civil contempt proceedings are separate from criminal proceedings based on the same events. Court orders must ordinarily be enforced swiftly and effectively. A court may adjourn contempt proceedings only where a real risk of prejudice could lead to injustice. The Human Rights Act 1998 had not altered that position.

• Court of Appeal: Allowed Mr Hurst’s appeal against sentence to the limited extent of substituting three months’ imprisonment for nine months. Permission was granted for the council’s cross-appeal, but no order was made because it had become academic.
• Barnet County Court: On 3 May 2002, Her Honour Judge Bevington committed Mr Hurst to prison for nine months for an admitted breach of an undertaking and adjourned the balance of the committal application pending criminal proceedings.