V (A Child), Re

Permission for a second appeal requires the high threshold in the Access to Justice Act 1999, section 55: an important point of law or principle, or another compelling reason. An appellate court should respect an experienced lower court’s exercise of discretion unless error is shown or the conclusion is plainly wrong. Minor inaccuracies in the lower court’s historical summary do not justify intervention where they do not affect the discretionary reasoning. This applied where the application was viewed as an attempt to circumvent a restriction under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989.

The case concerned a child in local authority care and an application by Mrs F’s father for leave to apply for contact. District Judge Maple refused leave on 3 January 2002. Kirkwood J considered the resulting appeal and made an order on 20 February 2002. Mrs F then sought, on her father’s behalf, permission for a further appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The central questions were whether the statutory threshold for a second appeal was met and whether the lower courts’ exercise of discretion disclosed an error, an important point of law or principle, or another compelling reason.

1. Application dismissed. Lord Justice Thorpe held that section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 imposed a very high threshold because an appeal had already occurred in the court of trial. Permission could be granted only if the case revealed an important point of law or principle or some other compelling reason. The application did not satisfy that threshold.
2. District Judge Maple had treated the application for contact by Mrs F’s father as an attempt by Mrs F to circumvent the restriction imposed on her under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989. In that context, the District Judge’s discretionary refusal of leave was not open to criticism.
3. Kirkwood J had also exercised a discretion when reviewing the District Judge’s decision. He was required to respect the disposal reached by an experienced District Judge unless there was evidence of error or the discretionary conclusion was plainly wrong. No such evidence or demonstration had been provided.
4. Errors in the lower court’s account of the history, even if present, were insubstantial. They did not invalidate the discretionary review or undermine the conclusion that the appeal lacked merit. The application was an attempt to extend the litigation indefinitely and was dismissed without hesitation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 17 June 2002, Lord Justice Thorpe dismissed the application for permission to bring a further appeal: [2002] EWCA Civ 1016.
• Family Division: Kirkwood J made an order on 20 February 2002 following the appeal from District Judge Maple’s refusal of leave.
• District Judge Maple: On 3 January 2002, refused Mrs F’s father leave to apply for contact with the child.